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ABSTRACT 
 The quantification of risk has received a great deal of attention in recently published 
literature, and there is an opportunity for the DoD to take advantage of what information is 
currently available to fundamentally improve on current risk assessment and management 
processes. The critical elements absent in the current process are the objective assessment of 
likelihood as part of the whole risk scenario and a visual representation or acknowledgement 
of uncertainty. A proposed framework would incorporate selected elements of multiple 
theories and axiomatic approaches in order to: (1) simultaneously examine multiple 
objectives of the organization, (2) limit bias and subjectivity during the assessment process 
by converting subjective risk contributors into quantitative values using tools that measure 
the attack surface and adversarial effort, (3) present likelihood and impact as real-time 
objective variables that reflect the state of the organization and are grounded on sound 
mathematical and scientific principles, (4) aggregate and function organization-wide  
(strategic, operational, and tactical) with maximum transparency, (5) achieve greater 
representation of the real scenario and strive to model future scenarios, (6) adapt to the 
preferred granularity, dimensions, and discovery of the decision maker, and (7) improve the 
decision maker’s ability to select the most optimal alternative by reducing the decision to 
rational logic. The proposed solution is what I term "Risk Management Framework 2.0", and 
the expected results of this modernized framework are reduced complexity, improved 
optimization, and more effective management of risk within the organization. This study 
introduces a Decision Support System (DSS) concept to aid implementation, maximize 
transparency and cross-level communication, and keep members operating within the bounds 
of the proposed framework. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
He who knows and knows he knows,  
He is wise - follow him;  
He who knows not and knows he knows not,  
He is a child - teach him;  
He who knows and knows not he knows, 
 He is asleep - wake him;  
He who knows not and knows not he knows not, He is  
a fool - shun him. 
 
(Ancient Arabic Proverb) 
 
 
 There is a vital need for monumental change in how we communicate, assess, and 
model risk within the federal government. U.S. Army Defensive Cyberspace Operations 
Capability Developer and retired Army officer, Russell Fenton, endorses this argument by 
stating - “the current risk framework, as developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), is outdated and no longer effective in assessing true risk factoring 
threats, vulnerabilities, and other variables in a way that decision-makers can confidently 
understand the environment and envision how certain choices have the potential to impact 
future operations.” [R. Fenton, personal communication, 2016] This study aims to interpret 
the basic contributors of risk as quantifiable variables and present an alternative framework 
as to how the federal government can more effectively govern their risk management 
programs while improving upon the quality of risk considerations in the future. My proposed 
solution is termed “Risk Management Framework: 2.0” to indicate that this proposal shares 
many of the underpinnings of the current federal risk management framework, which 
proposes a proscriptive, deterministic, and reflexive approach to managing risk in the 
cyberspace domain using quantitative variables; a strategy for the post-modern world. 
 The evaluation of risk is, and will continue to be, essential to our survival as a 
species. Without assessing risk, the human species would have never progressed to becoming 
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the near-masters of our environment that we are today. There are only assumptions as to 
when our human ancestors first assessed risk, but conceivably this primitive assessment 
attempted to compare the consequences of remaining in the trees versus the benefits of 
climbing down to explore the surroundings for resources. Since this postulated moment, 
human strategies for determining and assessing risks have evolved tremendously. Recorded 
history indicates that our later ancestors relied on mystics, oracles, or religion for guidance 
when confronted with a decision between multiple scenarios or options. Tools, such as bones 
or dice, were even devised to assist decision-making when neither mysticism nor religion 
could provide assistance. The word “probability” originates from the Latin word probabilis, 
which means “worthy of approval”. “Worthiness” in Roman times was considered in the 
outcome of a roll of dice or knucklebones. Probability was eventually understood in the 17th 
Century courts of Europe as a measure of proof in a legal case. The meaning further evolved 
into “a measure of the weight of empirical evidence as to the chance a particular outcome”. 
[32] Due to the statistical and inferential powers of probability, recent history has seen an 
unprecedented growth and an insatiable determination to control our futures. This explosion 
becomes evident simply by observing the increasing frequency of risk discussions across 
literature. A word search using Google’s Ngram Viewer [33] illustrates this upsurge by 
querying the use of the word “risk” in literature versus use of “danger” from 1800-2000. 
Meanwhile, the latter’s usage has seen a gradual decline over the 20th Century. (See Figures 1 
and 2) Risk and danger were two entirely dissimilar words in earlier history, yet they have 
become more synonymous with one another (even replacing) as we approached the mid-
twentieth century. The trending of “risk” in literature appears to correspond with rapid 
advances in technology, by which an analysis of the aforementioned has shown potential to 
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assist us in modeling variables that impact the level or likelihood of danger imposed by a 
hazard thus allowing us to compare alternative courses of action that might result in less 
severe or more gainful outcomes. Powerful algorithms and increasing computing capabilities 
have revealed abilities to perform a variety of analyses to make sense of the data, and 
establish a diverse range of quantifiable metrics to help guide decision-making. As the 
prospect of risk quantification became increasingly manifest, organizations have made huge 
investments in unearthing any utility that could provide them with an advantage over their 
competitors or adversaries.   
 
Figure 1. - Ngram of “Risk”   
 
 
Figure 2. - Ngram of “Danger” 
 This quantification of risk has received a great deal of attention from academia over 
the past two decades, and there is an opportunity for the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
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take advantage of what information is currently available to fundamentally improve on 
current risk assessment and management processes since the introduction of the traditional 
risk matrix in MIL-STD 882 (1993). [34] A proposed framework, successive to the current 
RMF, would synthesize selected elements of various theories and visualization techniques in 
order to objectively assess likelihood and uncertainty variables, and to reduce the results of 
the analysis to a point that decision-makers are able to make a decision chiefly based on 
rational logic with the aid of a collaborative Decision Support System (DSS). There are 
significant challenges to quantifying risk variables in utilities or values applicable to the 
DoD, but this study suggests these challenges can be overcome with the introduction of a 
fresh approach to assessing and modeling risk.    
 As stated in the opening and subsequent paragraphs, the current risk management 
approach used by the DoD could greatly benefit from the lessons learned throughout this 
study. The current approach creates opportunities for the assessor to inject significant bias 
and subjectivity into the analysis, is loosely grounded on sound scientific or mathematical 
principles, and fails to present the results to the decision-maker in a tailored form that enables 
him or her to make the most qualified decision. (These issues will be discussed further and 
solutions provided in Chapters 3 and 4.) These issues combine to significantly hinder our 
ability to effectively manage risk. Less informed decision-making, stemming from unsound 
analyses and misguided perceptions, has resulted in some of the most severe unintended 
consequences in history costing countless lives due to miscalculations of risk by both society 
and organizational entities. Scientific and organizational experts prefer that society view the 
world as either random or probabilistic to assign accountability, but the world actually 
represents something more chaotic. Calculation aside, simply observing risk even causes 
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slight changes in risk variables that could have dramatically different outcomes and chaotic 
distributions as time progresses. A sound risk management program should minimize the 
effect observation has on the likelihoods and consequences of assessing risk, and join 
adaptive procedures and processes that help organizations march forward into a more stable 
and secure 21st Century. 
Table 1. - Gartner’s Governance Maturity Model (Risk Approach) [35] 
Level 1: 
Ad Hoc 
Level 2: 
Isolated 
Complacency 
Level 3: 
Risk 
Mitigation 
Level 4: 
Benefit 
Optimization 
Level 5: 
Competitive 
Advantage 
Ignore/Deny 
Risks 
Respond 
reactively to 
imminent risks 
only 
Proactively ID 
and manage cost, 
compliance, and 
security risks 
Accept and 
manage business 
risks based on 
ROI  
Take calculated 
approach to 
financial 
management 
 
 Gartner developed a governance model that identifies deliverables at each 
organizational maturity level across six different business domains, with “risk approach” 
being one of them. [35] (See Table 1) An organization achieves level four (benefit 
optimization) when it can “accept and manage business risks based on a Return on 
Investment (ROI) model”, and has achieved level five (competitive advantage) when it can 
“take calculated risks for a competitive advantage”. Most organizations strive to reach these 
highest levels of maturity in their risk management programs, but unfortunately many 
programs are inhibited at levels two and three due to subjective or rigid risk management 
strategies. The envy of all organizations are those that have been identified as a High 
Reliability Organization (i.e. HRO). What distinguishes HROs from other organizations is 
that they have achieved nearly flawless operations while maintaining high risk and complex 
systems. Experts have been unable to clearly determine how HROs achieve these results, but 
they assume it is due to their ability to maintain “bureaucratic structures that are hierarchical 
and rigid during routine operations, but flat and flexible during times of crisis.” [15, p. 149] 
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By making optimization a top priority for their risk management programs and mirroring the 
characteristics of HROs, organizations can chart a course to achieving greater reliability, 
robustness, and success in the future. 
 The Department of Defense opened an opportunity to improve upon or craft new 
methodologies in their March 2014 instruction, DoDI 8510.01, by stating in Enclosure 6, 
Step 4 (Assess Security Controls): [1] 
“An assessment methodology consistent with [NIST 800-37] is provided as a 
model for use or adaptation. DoD Components will use this model, or justify the 
use of another risk assessment methodology within the Component, to include 
addressing understanding of the impact on reciprocity across all communities.”  
 
This chapter is prefaced with an ancient Arabic proverb that categorizes the four types of 
mindsets in an organization: the wise, the ignorant, those asleep, and the fools. Any proposed 
framework should attempt to make the wise wiser, educate the ignorant, motivate others, and 
force the organization to address any uncertainty in the data. This is a lofty goal and littered 
with challenges, but there are champions in the cybersecurity discipline that address steps to 
correcting our current mindsets. Cybersecurity expert, Chris Williams at Leidos Inc., has 
proposed four “Next-Generation Cyberdefense Axioms” to revolutionize and perfect the 
mindsets for professionals working to defend their organizations against cyber-related 
threats: (1) assume an intelligent attacker will eventually defeat all defensive measures, (2) 
design defenses to detect and delay attacks so defenders have time to respond, (3) layer 
defenses to contain attacks and provide redundancy in protection, and (4) use an active 
defense to catch and repel attacks after they start, but before they can succeed. [27] This 
study will attempt to build upon these axioms as fundamental objectives in changing the way 
risk is socially and individually perceived, constructed, and managed. Most contemporary 
strategies oppose these axioms and have led to unsustainable levels of complexity across 
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both social and organizational risk management programs. New York University Professor of 
Sociology, David Garland, has been quoted as saying, “Risk society is our late modern world 
spinning out of control”, and followed up by asking the question: “Would we do better to 
slow progress and evaluate ourselves?” [14, p. 6] Few would argue that the rise of 
neoliberalism, or laissez-faire economic liberalism, has not served as part of the driving force 
behind this trend as opportunities are seized by those who have mastered the art and science 
of risk taking. Unfortunately like matter risk cannot be eliminated, but only redistributed. 
This was the case in the U.S. Financial Collapse of 2008 where opportunists were making 
irresponsible and risky financial decisions, and the consequences of these decisions were 
ultimately absorbed by the American taxpayer. There is a ubiquitous social realization of 
these immoral activities thus causing an erosion of trust and faith in many foundations. 
Perhaps taking a fundamentally different approach could help restore this faith? 
 This study begins in Chapter 2 by summarizing previous work performed in this 
discipline including the fundamentals of measuring risk, alternative approaches to the 
quantification of risk, various theories that support this study, and NIST guidelines within the 
current Risk Management Framework (RMF). The immediately following chapter attempts 
to describe the problem by examining the shortfalls of contemporary organizational risk 
management programs, keying in on the shortfalls of subjective analyses, and illuminating 
the need for monumental change in preparation for the era succeeding Modernism. The final 
two chapters will provide a solution to the current RMF, conceptualized in the form of a 
Decision Support System, and then articulate a logical and coherent course for 
implementation. It is worth supposing that there may be superior strategies to addressing the 
problems identified in this thesis, however any chosen strategy “in the end must link risk to 
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mission assurance” to realize the ultimate objectives of any organization. [R. Fenton, 
personal communication, 2016] 
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND and PRIOR WORK 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” ~ George Box, 1987 
 
 Organizations that have been able to perfect the art and science of risk management 
ultimately become masters within their domains. Oxford mathematician Marcus De Saytoy, 
said that “predicting the future is the ultimate power.” [28] This concept can be illustrated 
through one of the stories told of Christopher Columbus when he landed on the shores of the 
Americas in 1504, and needed provisions for his men. He communicated to the natives that if 
they did not supply his men these provisions their god would become angry and remove the 
Moon. What Columbus had, and the natives did not, was knowledge of the lunar cycle. As 
Columbus predicted, those present witnessed a lunar eclipse and the natives had no other 
explanation than to trust that their god was in fact mad at them for not coming to his aid. [36] 
This single example demonstrates the asymmetrical advantage that can exist between 
opponents due to one actor’s ignorance, the influence uncertainty can have on the selected 
actions, and how empirical observations can be used to model the future.  
 The primary objectives of this study are to (1) develop a framework that better meets 
the needs and functions for managing risks in the cyber domain, (2) demonstrate that 
objectivity increases decision-power and program reliability in the evaluation of risk, and (3) 
identify practical means of quantifying uncertainty. These objectives will be achieved by 
understanding the fundamentals of risk management, examining multiple theories and 
approaches that help organizations determine the root causes of risk, and evaluating the 
current framework as compared to the proposed framework. Before the problems this thesis 
attempts to address can be fully described, certain concepts must be understood first. This 
chapter begins by discussing various ways risk is measured and modeled, and how 
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organizations use this information to manage risk within them. It then progresses into what 
roles uncertainty plays in risk management, and how experts have attempted to reduce its 
impact on informed decision making. The chapter also reviews several alternative methods 
that could have application within the proposed framework. After these methods have been 
discussed, we will describe various social theories, risk management approaches, and 
abstraction techniques that led to the development of a framework most suited to addressing 
the many systemic problems highlighted throughout this study. The chapter will conclude by 
reviewing the history of the NIST organization and their guidelines for assessing and 
managing risk within their recommended framework, then provides a preliminary survey of 
the problems that will be examined in the following chapter.     
2.1 Measuring and Modeling Risk 
 Risk assessments generally attempt to answer three fundamental questions: (1) What 
can go wrong? (2) What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? (3) What are the 
consequences? [9] These questions are answered by identifying and prioritizing risk factors, 
assigning values to those variables that contribute to the likelihood of an event occurring, and 
determining how those events impact mission or business operations. This study feels that all 
three questions can be mathematically answered, and then judged through subjective means. 
Mathematically answering these questions is critical because the results can be validated in 
most cases. Though this effort is especially challenging to those responsible for producing 
these answers, their efforts can be alleviated by first understanding what is exactly at risk and 
how that information translates to organizational risk. This investigation leads the 
organization to developing its own understanding of risk, and how it can most appropriately 
manage the factors that create negative exposure. 
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2.1.1 Risk.  
 One of the most significant challenges in any risk management program lies in the 
measurement of risk variables, and combining those variables in such a way that risk 
potential can be coherently modeled. Risk experts have similar definitions of risk with minor 
differences, but the term can be broadly defined as the measured certainty of an outcome due 
to an event or activity where these outcomes result as sequences of cause and effect. The 
recognition of “causes” and their “effects” is critical because identifying those relationships 
enables organizations to truly engage risk in manners aligned with this thesis. Organizations 
use risk measurements to help guide decisions and develop courses of action that minimize 
exposures or maximize opportunities. There are various factors that contribute to an 
organization’s risk, and these factors can be prioritized by first and second order factors. [6] 
First order factors are those that dominate all others, and serve as the primary driving force in 
decision-making. Examples include: funding, personnel, or maturity. All second-order 
factors are those intrinsic and extrinsic attributes that are derived from the dominating 
factors, such as quality (derived from funding), intellectual capital (derived from personnel), 
or lifecycle (derived from maturity). The list of risk factors can be infinite, but it is critical to 
have a filtering mechanism that differentiates between first-order and second-order factors.  
Identifying risk factors also depends on the granularity and scope of the decision. Due to the 
broad range of risk factors and the challenge of prioritizing them, this study suggests that risk 
factors should focus more on addressing the consequential impacts of a threat rather than the 
results of the threat. For example, an organization should address the risk of degraded 
communications vs. a Denial of Service (DoS) event because that second-order risk factor 
speaks to the business impact while a DoS lacks that specificity as to what is considered “true 
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risk” to the organization. This objective of identifying true risk factors can be achieved by 
studying the relationships that exist among risk variables.  
 In studying the relationships between risk and its impact to the mission of the 
organization, a synergistic understanding of the system and corresponding sources of risk 
and/or uncertainty are gained. [9] The central relationship in cyberspace is between the 
defender and the adversary, and that relationship is most evident in the outcomes (rewards or 
losses) of an event or activity. These relationships shouldn’t be mapped one-to-one, but 
rather one-to-many. This is a difficult task, and should mainly focus on objective 
relationships rather than subjective relationships. Even objective relationships can be 
imperfect, but they can still be statistically significant in the form of probabilities. [10] 
Probabilities are heavily dependent on the relational perceptions between the subject and 
object [11], and even known probabilities represent a distinct relationship between the 
assessor and the event [23]. Establishing relationships between human activities and 
consequences is a complex challenge [15], but this challenge can be reduced by driving down 
to the primary roots of those relationships. Regardless of what relationships are revealed, 
describing the concept of risk to an audience is articulating the relationship between realities 
and individual perceptions. [16]     
 Total risk avoidance is impossible to achieve, therefore it is necessary to measure the 
amount of risk exposure in order to allocate resources to reducing this exposure to a cost-
effective level. One recommendation is given by Jack V. Micheals, Ph.D where he gives the 
following rule of thumb: “invest one dollar in risk avoidance for every four dollars of risk 
exposure”. [6, p. 1] Even though this general rule has some utility, the challenge still remains 
in quantifying the amount of risk exposure an organization faces and how to appropriately 
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manage perceptions of decision-makers so that investment dollars are optimally spent. The 
first step in overcoming this challenge is to develop the most accurate estimation of risk, and 
then model the data in such a way that best communicates the amount of exposure.  
2.1.2 Quantifying Risk.  
 There are primarily two approaches to describing risk, and they are through 
qualitative or quantitative analysis. [11] Qualitative analysis is subjective by nature and uses 
a person’s expert opinion to estimate the amounts of risk, while quantitative analysis is based 
on objective measurements gathered through empirical or previous observations. Qualitative 
inputs are generated by enlisting the expertise of various professionals to assign a qualitative 
category to a relationship between variables that expresses their highly regarded and trusted 
opinions. On the other hand, there are a variety of ways to generate quantitative inputs. For 
example, an assessor could extract statistical relevance from historical records, measure 
various features of a system or organization through observational means, or assign weights 
to variables that directly link to an individual’s utilities. In either approach, both suppose that 
overall risk equals the likelihood of an adverse event joined by the magnitude of impact 
resulting from that event. As a general rule, all variables should be assessed holistically to 
describe the totality of a scenario that a system or organization faces in the event of an 
outcome.  
 Author Yukov Haimes maintains the notion that measuring risk is an empirical, 
quantitative, and scientific activity while determining the acceptability of risk is a qualitative 
and political activity [9]. Risk analysis is considered scientific in that scientific principles are 
applied when determining the likelihood of an event and its severity of harm. These 
principles involve thorough investigation, passive observation, acquiring knowledge and 
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seeking answers, experimenting and testing, and forming and modifying hypotheses. A 
discovery process that solely relies on qualitative inputs cannot adhere to these well-
established principles. On the contrary, any methodology that lacks a combination of 
quantitative inputs and qualitative determinations is thereby insufficient, and could 
potentially increase organizational risk-exposure if either of these elements aren’t utilized 
appropriately or completely omitted.  
 As identified by NIST in [3], both approaches present their own set of challenges. 
The major challenge presented by qualitative analysis is in the opinions and experiences of 
the assessor, and how that individual chooses to present the results of the analysis. Two 
challenges presented by quantitative analysis are in the occasional difficulty interpreting 
results and the potential for substantial uncertainty in the values. [3] Yukov Haimes adds an 
additional challenge to quantitative assessments in that all sources of risk against a system 
must be evaluated. [9] The list of sources could be endless, but this statement by Haimes 
could be interpreted as a holistic collection of all relevant information using the chosen data 
collection technique. Haimes suggests in [9] that these challenges can be reduced through 
improved data and analytical techniques with the intent of minimizing measurement errors or 
uncertainty. Fortunately there are tools and techniques in development that will be able to 
effectively collect all the information for a data set in the near future. One technique with 
potential to effectively describe a system’s vulnerability is through the use of a computer 
algorithm to measure the attack surface of a particular system. [8] Once all the selected 
variables have been measured using comparable techniques, then the assessor can aggregate 
the data into a model that provides the maximum amount of insight to the decision problem.  
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 Risk correlates to organizational costs in a variety of ways. Those costs can be 
determined as factors of money, time, reputation, or other organizational resources. 
Organizational resources can be thought of as a collection of personnel, equipment, funds, 
and/or information technology within an organization. [2] The existing relationships between 
costs and resources supports the idea that it must be theoretically possible to quantify risk 
because costs can be quantified, and the goal of reducing costs to the organization by 
avoiding negative impacts is the primary driving force behind performing risk assessments. 
Any risk model under development must function by starting from a threshold of 
unacceptable cost(s) to the organization, because organizational risk effectively equates to a 
measure of potentially detrimental cost(s) to the organization and determines how each 
variable contributes to the potential gains or losses of a risk management decision. [5] 
Furthermore, using the word “cost” synonymously with “risk” aids the discussion and helps 
frame the problem in a context that is more universally understood. 
2.1.3 Risk Variable Selection. 
 The essence of assessing risk is to reduce risk exposure to a cost-effective level [6], 
therefore it is critical that discretion is taken in selecting those variables that will perform to 
the maximum expectations of the decision-maker. The selection of risk variables depends on 
the structure of the optimization problem, and the mathematical properties of the decision 
primarily determines which variables will fit in the model. The sources of variable 
information are from historical data, theoretical considerations, and expert analysis. [21] The 
two variables fundamental to all risk assessments are likelihood and impact, and there are 
supporting variables to enable the assessor to estimate these fundamental values such as time, 
costs (or organizational resources), vulnerabilities, system maturity, attack surface, or a 
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resource’s functional worth. Deciding which variables support the optimization problem and 
mathematical properties of the decision ultimately depends on the variables’ potential for 
abstraction into some sort of business intelligence that can be used by the decision-making 
hierarchy. [9]  
  The primary variables evaluated throughout this study are those that demonstrate the 
greatest support in evaluating risks in the cyberspace domain, and they are: vulnerability, 
likelihood, impact, and uncertainty. Vulnerability has the greatest influence on how an 
organization should invest its resources [5], and represents an organization’s exposure/ 
sensitivity to danger or some measure of resilience. [14] Crime analysis shows that victims 
aren’t targeted by random; they are targeted based up their perceived vulnerability. [28] This 
adversarial perception can be shaped by many factors, and will change over time. Russell 
Fenton agrees that vulnerability assessments should include elements of time and some 
quantifiable value. [R. Fenton, personal communication, 2016] These quantifiable values can 
be derived from measuring the attack surface, compiling an adversary benefit structure for 
completing some objective, and showing how these two variables morph over time. The 
cybersecurity strategy known as “Moving Target Defense” (MTD) employs a technique 
called Damage-Effort Ratio (DER) that functions in a similar way. [8] (Both MTD and DER 
will be described in further detail later in the chapter.)  
 Likelihood in this study represents a measure of susceptibility that combines the 
assessed vulnerability of a targeted system and the adversary’s reward of attacking the target, 
and is disassociated from its common representation as probabilities. Probability should 
instead represent a degree of certainty in the data since likelihood has been applied as a state 
variable in the proposed risk model. Though likelihoods are often represented in probabilities 
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in a traditional sense, there are significant problems with assigning probabilities; for 
example, how decision-makers interpret numerical or subjective probabilities. It was Italian 
statistician Bruno de Finetti who said that “probability does not exist” because probabilities 
primarily depend on the relationship between the object and subject, and they are all based on 
unprovable assumptions. [11, p. 20] The proposed framework applies Determinism as a 
fundamental concept, and a model cannot be deterministic and probabilistic at the same time, 
therefore probability must not be considered objectively or represent likelihood within this 
framework.  
 Impact is the second fundamental variable used to model risk, and this study defines 
this variable as a measure of the effect an outcome can have on business or mission processes 
because truly “knowing the impact enhances Impact Analysis” as stated by Haimes. [9, p. 
346] Impact isn’t one single measurement, but a combination of one-to-many relationships 
between threats and impacts [6] that represent the state of the organization following an 
event. There are far more hazards than there are impacts, and an assessor will never have 
reasonable time to develop a comprehensive list of all known hazards. Therefore it is optimal 
to represent impact as a consequential cost against the organization if outcomes (A) or (B) 
were to occur. Michaels suggests two formulas that can achieve this goal, Risk Time Estimate 
(RTE) and Risk Cost Estimates (RCE). [6] (These calculations will be explained in Section 
2.4.1.) RCE/RTE (or impact) combined with a measure of the organization’s susceptibility 
(i.e. likelihood) provides the most functional and dynamic representation of the true 
insecurities organizations face. 
 Uncertainty is a critical variable that is often underrepresented in today’s models, and 
serves as the greatest challenge in estimating risk. Probability can serve as a measure of 
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uncertainty in this framework, but there are significant challenges within determining 
probabilities as previously mentioned. Due to the variabilities that exist in any measure of 
certainty, this study hopes to achieve separation between the likelihood and uncertainty 
variables by presenting both as independent contributors to the risk model. There are a 
variety of ways to model uncertainty in the context of this study, such as: Uncertainty 
Sensitivity Indexes [9], Bayesian Statistics, Confidence Intervals, Expected Values, 
Insufficient Reason, or Poisson Distributions. [10] The list of possible representations is 
extensive, and any universally accepted model should provide the option of selecting 
different methods that are optimally suited to the mathematical properties of the decision 
problem. Before proceeding, it is important to note the difference between uncertainty and 
deep uncertainties. Deep uncertainties are those risk components that will never be able to be 
described scientifically [22], and all remaining uncertainties are those variables that have 
measurable limits to their precisions. Deep uncertainties are isolated earlier in the proposed 
framework through the Info-Gap Procedure, and all remaining uncertainties are quantified by 
establishing statistical relevance in the data through the variety of means mentioned above.   
2.1.4 Modeling and Techniques. 
 Modeling risk is crucial in making sense of the data [16], and attempts to uncover the 
logical relationship between hypothesis and evidence (or data distributions) by isolating a 
causal agent from intervening variables. [21] Modeling also enables us to look into the past 
and predict the future as shown in the Christopher Columbus example. [28] The process for 
developing a model is fairly standard, and begins with determining the specific needs for 
modeling a scenario. Once the need has been firmly established, the problem is formulated 
within the higher tiers of the organization. After these needs have been well established and 
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agreed upon, subordinate tiers within the organization begin model construction by collecting 
and analyzing data pertinent to the problem. Following model construction, the model is 
validated and run, and the findings are analyzed to determine if further refinements are 
required or if the findings will be implemented. [6] There are a variety of modeling 
techniques and practices to build upon in order to develop a model that fits each decision 
problem. Jack V. Michaels provides three broad categories of models in [6]: network, 
decision, and cost/risk analysis models. Additionally, there are several ways to model the 
presentation of the data: iconic, symbolic, and analog representations. This study is primarily 
interested in combining one of three previously mentioned model categories and 
representations using one of the following mathematical models for risk simulations as 
categorized by Yacov Y. Haimes in [9] as either: linear, non-linear, deterministic, 
probabilistic, static, dynamic, distributed, or lumped. This study concludes that the ideal 
model combination for assessing and communicating risk within cyberspace is a cost/risk 
analysis model with analog representations that supports non-linear, deterministic, and 
dynamic mathematical techniques for variable formulation. This study suggests analog 
representations are best suited for the proposed model since they allow greater 
reproducibility and all risk decisions with the DoD are associated with some sort of 
organizational cost metric. Non-linear simulation techniques show the greatest potential for 
the proposed model due to an object’s random behavior patterns. The model should be 
deterministic to illuminate relationships, and dynamic because optimal control selection is 
dependent upon changes within the environment. Once the optimal solution is discovered, 
then that solution can be implemented. [9] Other options that may be taken into account are 
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sensitivity, responsivity, and irreversibility to provide further benefits and/or enhancement. 
[9] 
2.1.5 Observation and Modeling Risk.      
 Accurately modeling risk is extremely challenging because risk is conditional upon 
the behaviors, actions, and perceptions of subjects and objects within the environment. [10] 
Additionally, risk is constantly in motion as it moves in response from attempts to take 
measurements as relative to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. [11] Accuracy of a model 
is dependent on how closely it represents the system [9], and simply observing objects within 
cyberspace can have an indirect impact on their behaviors and actions. This effect is referred 
to as the Hawthorne Effect [10] or the Beijing Butterfly Effect [11]. Deploying an intrusion 
detection system (IDS) is an example of these effects in a situation where the IDS becomes 
detectable by an intelligent adversary. Any discovery by either the defender or the adversary 
of the other’s presence could drastically alter their tactics as the Exchange Principle applies 
to both offensive and defensive actors. Additionally, closely monitoring the state of the 
organization can affect the decisions process. The Markov Decision Process is one such 
framework that implies a subject’s observation can affect his or her decisions when an agent 
(or subject) makes assumptions on the next state based on the observed state of things, and 
ultimately receives a reward for selecting that action. In most cases, the reward is a 
deterministic function of both the observed state of the organization and the outcomes 
associated with certain actions. [19] The Expected Utility Function also shows that 
observation has an impact on our decision processes through the formula: EU (a|o) = Σ P 
(si|a,o) U (si). The formula states that a decision-maker’s expected utility (EU) for a 
particular action-observation combination (a|o) equals the sum of probabilities for the states 
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of the world as observed (o) while taking action (a), and our preferences over the space of 
outcomes are represented by U (si). [19] This accepted formula demonstrates that our 
personal utilities are encoded by our observation of the state of things over time. One simple 
example that illustrates this concept is the future value of money over time based on previous 
observations of rising inflation. All of the negative effects of observation can be limited by 
interpreting likelihood as an organizational state of security versus a probability, focusing on 
objective measurements of risk variables, and removing threat assessments from the risk 
model.  
2.2 Managing Risk 
 Risk Management is an “executive function of controlling hazards and consequences 
that organizations encounter” [6, p. 1], and is continuous over the lifecycle of the project [9]. 
Organizations perform this function through the careful selection of management techniques, 
strategies, and standard practices or policies. Challenges organizations often face in their risk 
management programs are managing blame, controlling expectations, and influencing 
behaviors as risks morph over time. Due to these requirements and challenges, solid risk 
management programs must start with the full commitment of the organization’s top 
management. Where top management often fail is when they focus on managing people 
versus managing the system. [6] In addition to appropriately managing the system, decision-
makers must understand the value of the risk assessment, be made aware of the effects of 
their decisions, ensure availability and credibility of the analysis, and take into account any 
biases that exist in their organizations. [9] Author and academic, Clayton Christensen, said 
that “solving challenges in life requires a deep understanding of what causes what to happen” 
[18, p. 16], and this understanding enables the decision-maker to select the best strategies and 
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apply the best theories to implement a framework that provides maximum insight to the 
decision problem.  
 Risk frameworks should manage from the top, and assess from the bottom. [6] The 
technical side of risk management should answer the “who, when, how”, while the business 
side should focus on addressing the “who and where”. [6] Risk frameworks must be capable 
of aggregating and dividing processes because risks in each subsystem within the 
organization ultimately determines the risk of the overall system being assessed. [9] The 
program (or framework) must also engage the entire organization and ensure maximum 
transparency for maximum success. [6, 9] This objective is made possible by allowing every 
member an opportunity to make a contribution to the decision process which gives them the 
sense of inclusion in their organization, and also allows members to increase their 
competence through the individual process of making their own judgments. [10] The authors 
of [7] suggest that the “People” domain is most vital among the STOPE (Strategy, 
Technology, Organization, People, and Environment) domains, and the needs of the 
decision-maker are the most important of all people in the organization; of most interest to 
the decision-maker is how the decision variables link to his or her utilities. 
 A goal for risk management is reducing the decision to logic, and selecting the 
alternative with the highest utility. [15] An understanding of the decision-maker’s utilities 
enables the organization to effectively quantify potential gains and losses [10], however both 
still remain subject to interpretation. For this reason, the decision must be defined in the 
decision-maker’s terms as appropriate [15]. The challenges with leveraging utilities in risk 
management are due to mobility, inherent subjective properties, and the uniqueness of 
possible utility forms. One example of utility mobilization occurs when the willingness to 
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gamble decreases as the odds increase. Another example is reduced satisfaction experienced 
from a second glass of water versus the first glass. Both of these examples illustrate the Law 
of Diminishing Marginal Utility [15], but utilities can also increase as well. There are 
basically two groups of utilities, and those are decision and experience utility. Decision 
Utility is a computation about the expected future utility that is predicted, while Experienced 
Utility is a utility chosen when an outcome has been previously experienced. [11] In the 
absence of probabilities (which is what this study hopes to limit), the Subjective Expected 
Utility Function may be used as developed by L. J. Savage. [15] Assuming the decision-
maker adheres to axioms of rationality, this function combines a personal utility function 
with a personal and unique expected probability distribution.  
 Risk management boils down to people and processes, and how they all support the 
mission of the organization. Decision-making is often a collective process that involves a 
diverse body of people, but the decision still rests with the top decision-maker at the 
conclusion of a risk assessment. For that reason, the problem must be described in such a 
way that an application of utility-based logic is capable of comparing alternatives and 
selecting courses of action that are optimally suited to the aims of the decision-maker. 
Unfortunately there will always be some knowledge gaps throughout the decision process, 
but gaining an enhanced understanding of uncertainty and fully acknowledging its existence 
enables organizations to overcome many of the posed limitations stemming from these gaps. 
2.3 Principles of Uncertainty 
 Perhaps the greatest challenge to risk management is in managing the expectations 
and perceptions that fill voids created by uncertainty. Yukov Haimes says that “uncertainty 
colors the decision-making process”, and personally feels that the need for assessing risk 
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increases with less knowledge on a system. [9, p. 27] Because of this significance, 
uncertainty lies at the heart of risk management. Haimes defines uncertainty as “the inability 
to determine the true state of a system where no reasonable probabilities can be assigned to 
outcomes” [9, p. 227], while risk expert Sir David Spielgelhalter simply equates risk with 
uncertainty. [11] In the context of this study, uncertainty occurs when variables cannot be 
described with concrete objectivity or fluctuations in the variables must be explained through 
statistical inferences. [9] Unfortunately for all organizations, uncertainty is inherent in the 
evaluation of risk and must be managed appropriately. [3] In addition to top-level 
commitment, an expression of uncertainty is one of risk management absolutes and best 
expressed quantitatively when optimal. [6] Despite the limitations, uncertainty can also 
create an advantage for the cyber-defenders as described by the Moving Target Defense 
strategy whereby implementing dynamic environments result in systems less vulnerable to 
attacks. [8] Before one can harness the potential benefits of uncertainty, a deeper and 
fundamental understanding is required.   
2.3.1 Understanding Uncertainty. 
 The Uncertainty Principle states that there are limits to precision, therefore 
uncertainty will always exist. [14] Applying this principle is fundamental in risk management 
because risk models can create the illusion that probabilities are highly reliable 
measurements. Probabilities can be deceptive when accepted as fact, but there are 
alternatives to quantifying certainty in the absence of probabilities. Uncertainty is introduced 
from a variety of sources, and John Adams has identified four primary sources in [10]: 
variability in susceptibility, latency periods, the compounded effect of combination of 
threats, and initial conditions. Sir David Speilgelhalter says that there are “deeper 
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uncertainties” of which the organization should be made aware. These deeper uncertainties 
are those that science may never be able to solve, and Spiegelhalter proposes that quantitative 
and qualitative measurements must be brought together. This synthesis of objective and 
subjective measurements would acknowledge the limitations of math and engage the social 
sciences to critique. [22] Frank Knight proposes that the use of the word “uncertainty” be 
restricted to variables of non-quantitative types only. [22] Regardless of how organizations 
decide to tackle uncertainty, they must allocate resources to reducing uncertainty to the 
maximum extent possible.  
2.3.2 Managing Uncertainty. 
 Yacov Haimes prefaced his discussion on uncertainty in [9] by quoting Alvin Toffler: 
“it is better to have a general and an incomplete map, subject to revision and correction, than 
to have no map at all.” [p. 4] Fortunately improved data and analytical techniques can help 
manage uncertainty, and modeling intricate details among subsystems improves the process 
of quantifying uncertainty. [9] In addition to the various quantification methods mentioned in 
Section 2.1, a risk model could apply the Principle of Insufficient Reason as a means to 
represent probabilities in a deterministic model within an independent dimension. This 
principle was developed by early mathematicians Jacob Bernoulli and Pierre Simon Laplace, 
and works under the assumption that no probabilities are known. To overcome this gap, each 
event is simply assigned a probability equal to 1 divided by the number of possible outcomes 
for that single event. [17] There are additional substitutions to probability such as an analysis 
of the: reliability, maintainability, sensitivity, responsivity, stability, or irreversibility of a 
system. Uncertainty can also be displaced by decomposing a complex system into smaller 
subsystems. [9] By decomposing a complex system, we gain a further synergistic 
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understanding of the system and corresponding sources of risk or uncertainty. [9] If top 
management insists on including probabilities, Bayes’ Theorem is one option with potential 
application within the proposed framework’s risk model by basing the probability of an event 
as it relates to certain conditions. The formula is a conditional probability that Event A 
occurs given that Condition B is true, which equals the probability of A multiplied by the 
probability of observing B given that A is true and divided by the probability of B; {P(A|B) = 
P(A) P(B|A) / P(B)}. As an example, suppose the probability of an email server failing (A) 
due to a virus introduction (B) equals the probability of an email server failing at some point 
(50%) multiplied by the probability that a virus could cause an email server to fail (20%). 
This number is then divided by the probability of a virus introduction to the system (30%) 
which would result in a 33% probability of the scenario occurring. Confidence Intervals and 
Poisson’s Distribution are additional alternatives to measuring uncertainty in objective data, 
and definitions of each are provided in Appendix A.  
 Despite the challenges compounded by including uncertainty within the model, this 
infusion actually improves the effectiveness of the model. Ultimately, the best way to reduce 
uncertainty is by ensuring the model representing risk is as accurate to the real situation as 
possible. In addition to finding a way of representing or displacing uncertainty, managing 
this challenge also entails managing the expectations, perceptions, and fear of blame within 
the organization. Carlo C. Jaeger expressed doubts in [15] that one particular structure can 
manage these issues as organizations grapple with uncertainty and attempt to model 
uncertainty as variants of optimization procedures. Regardless, we have no choice but to do 
the best we can just as Alvin Toffler suggests in [9].   
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2.4 Supportive Frameworks, Theories, and Approaches 
 There are a variety of proposed frameworks, and any implementation helps 
organizations guide the risk management process and keep individuals on task. A good 
framework enables decision-makers to frame the problem to be analyzed, engages the entire 
organization in the process, and produces results that enable decision-makers to develop the 
best strategy for tackling the problem. Michaels says in [6] that is impossible to entirely 
evaluate risk deterministically, but that programs should put determinism to its limits. 
Determinism is a field of study that associates causes with effects, and suggests that every 
single outcome can be traced by analyzing sequences of events. This study focuses on 
assessing risk as a deterministic problem, and the following frameworks (or methodologies) 
have provided various degrees of influence on this study’s resulting framework. 
2.4.1 Supportive Frameworks and Methodologies. 
 A framework is not necessarily a formula or a model style, but a unified attack vector 
that represents the mindset of members that apply and operate within the framework. The 
following frameworks and methodologies have contributed to the development of a “unified 
attack vector” most suitable to managing risk in the cyberspace domain: Pre-Mortem 
Analysis, Technical Risk Management framework, the Gordon-Loeb Model, the Monte-
Carlo Method, Risk Filtering Ranking and Management framework, and methodologies 
behind the Moving Target Defense strategy.  
  Pre-Mortem Analysis is one such methodology that is forward looking and seeks to 
identify vulnerabilities in a plan by imagining a project has failed before it starts. This 
process begins by gathering the team that will participate in the analysis. The team then 
decides on a catastrophic outcome to analyze. Once this outcome has been selected, team 
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members individually generate reasons for failure and consolidate their lists. Simulations are 
then run, and the team revisits the original plan for optimization. Subsequent reviews are 
conducted to re-sensitize team members to emerging problems. [29]  
 Jack V. Michaels recommends a framework in [6] that he calls “Technical Risk 
Management”, which begins by generating lists of impacts associated with all 
subcomponents of a complex system. Those impacts with the greatest magnitude are then 
selected for analysis. Then a team analyzes those impacts to determine all the possible events 
or activities that could lead to the outcome. Once these possibilities are generated, then a 
likelihood variable is assigned to each one and prescribed a corrective action. The next step 
involves calculating the Risk Time and Cost Estimates for each outcome. The Risk Time and 
Cost Estimates are derived by adding the baseline estimates with a combination of 
corrective-action time/cost and the appropriate risk determinate factors. Baselines are 
estimates of time or cost to complete a task in the absence of hazards, and Risk Determinate 
Factors (RDF) which are quantified measures to serve as estimates of risk exposure. RDFs 
are computed by dividing previous risk cost/time estimates by the actual costs/times, and is a 
percentage between zero and one if costs or times were underestimated. These estimates are 
then rank-ordered and the team decides what controls could prevent these outcome from 
occurring or which could reduce the outcomes. The last step involves packaging the analysis 
in a form that presents the advantages of selecting one course of action over another to upper 
management. [6]  
 The Gordon-Loeb Model tries to determine the optimal amount to invest to protect a 
given set of information. Three parameters characterize the information set (S), and they are: 
(L) the loss resulting in a breach, (t) the likelihood of event occurring, and the (v) 
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vulnerability which represents the likelihood of an undesirable event successful causing a 
negative impact. Both (t) and (v) are both integers representing a probability residing 
between 0 and 1. The monetary investment in security needed to protect the resource is 
denoted by (z). There are three assumptions with this model: (1) any information set that is 
completely invulnerable requires zero investment, (2) zero investment in security makes the 
information set inherently vulnerable to an event or activity, and (3) increasing investments 
in security increases security at a decreasing rate. The Expected Net Benefits in Information 
Security (ENBIS) equals [vulnerability - Information Set (investment, vulnerability)] * Loss - 
Investment, or {ENBIS (z) = [v - S(z, v)] L - z}. Gordon and Loab suggests that 
organizations should invest in security only up until the point that marginal benefits equal 
marginal costs, and that most risk-neutral organizations will need to invest approximately 
37% of the expected loss of a breach into their information security programs. [5]  
 The Monte Carlo Method (MCM) is one methodology that proves useful when all 
others are impossible to use. The basic idea behind MCM is to encode random numbers with 
some sort of principle governing probability distribution. The process begins by tabulating 
variates of interest, and could be a set of metrics used to describe one domain within the 
problem; for example, sever off-line = time or frequency for individual previous events. Then 
the assessor derives some score to cumulate distribution based on each metric within the 
domain. Then a deterministic computation is performed on each cumulative distribution 
ranging from the last metric input through the next. For example, suppose a server went off-
line on two occasions, 60s and 80s respectively, which would compute a range for the second 
metric as 60 - 79. The next step requires the assessor to generate pseudorandom numbers into 
a table and selecting one random number that falls within the previous range that associates 
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with an actual measurement from the list of variates. An example would be an association of 
the event with a down time of 80s with a randomly generated number of 77. Finally the 
assessor would use the list of random numbers to perform statistical analysis on the complete 
list of associated random numbers, with mean and standard deviation being the most popular. 
[6]  
 Another framework is Yukov Haimes’ Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management 
(RFRM), which was developed for NASA with application towards the Space Shuttle 
program in the 1990s. RFRM is more philosophical than mechanical, forces a decision 
problem to focus on the actual contributors to risk, and comprises eight broad phases. In 
Phase I, a Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) is developed that organizes and presents 
a complete set of system risk categories or requirements for success. Increasing the levels 
within this structure improves the level of detail for analysis. Phase II filters risk scenarios or 
requirements according to the preferences of the decision-maker, and achieved through the 
experiences and knowledge of that collective or individual. Phase III uses a traditional risk 
matrix that compares likelihood and impact to provide a severity index for sub-scenarios to 
the primary scenarios developed through the HHM. Phase IV reflects on the ability of each 
scenario developed in Phase III to defeat any one of the three defensive properties of a 
system, which are: resilience, robustness, and redundancy. Those scenarios that are 
determined as able to defeat the system are then further evaluated against established criteria 
that relate to those abilities. For example, a virus could impact the robustness of a system and 
have the following characteristics: undetectable, cascading effects, or a high persistence. This 
scenario would be one of the sub-scenarios falling under the degraded operations risk 
scenario developed in Phase I. To complete Phase V, Bayes’ Theorem is used to quantify the 
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likelihood of each scenario based on available evidence, and is especially useful in modeling 
when there are many sources of uncertainty. Phase V ends by filtering out those scenarios 
that linger above established thresholds. Phase VI is the risk management phase where 
assessors ask the questions “what can be done” and “what options are available” to defeat 
these filtered scenarios. Cost is a major factor in this phase and guides much of the decision-
making, and trade-off analysis is conducted to evaluate the various options. This phase is 
also where selections are made on which options provide the maximum benefits. Phase VII 
determines the actual benefits of the options selected in Phase VI, and looks to determine if 
there are any relationships or interdependencies between scenarios discarded during the 
filtering process or whether policy options will be effective. The final phase is Phase VIII 
where operational feedback is collected following deployment of the options. The 
information collected during this phase will help guide decision-making in the future. [9]  
 The final supportive methodology this study mentions in detail is computation of the 
Damage-Effort Ratio (DER) to determine the likelihood of a cyber-attack, and was suggested 
as part of a Moving Target Defense (MTD) strategy which was funded by the Army 
Research Office and developed in 2012. [8] The entire strategy covered under MTD is 
beyond the scope of this study, and this review will limit itself to the DER component of 
MTD which strives to quantify likelihoods as weights represented by a system’s DER. DER 
is a combination of the damage an adversary could inflict on a system (or reward) and the 
amount of effort that would be required by the adversary in order to be successful. The 
simplified theory behind this approach is that the likelihood of an attack against a system is 
relative to the system’s vulnerabilities and the reward gained by the adversary, and is 
basically a cost-benefit analysis performed on behalf of the adversary. This approach is only 
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limited to non-natural adversaries as there are no reward elements in natural catastrophes. 
This assessment begins by measuring the number of entry/exit points (M), channels used to 
connect to a system (C), and untrusted data resources (I) comprising a particular system. 
This combined measurement provides a weighted amount of effort an adversary must expend 
in order to break the system, and helps compute the attack surface. Then each resource is 
assigned attributes ranging from method privilege (m), to access rights (a), or to channel 
protocols (c). Each of these attributes represent a numerical value such that one parameter 
within the set of access rights (a) is greater than another and benefits the adversary; for 
example, root > non-root. This list is non-exhaustive and selects those attributes that have 
priority sitting with management, but these are primarily the attributes used. By evaluating 
these attributes against the previous measurements, the total attack surface is a combination 
of the total contributions of methods (M), channels (C), and data resources (I) within the 
system’s environment. In respect to the computing environment (Es), a system’s (s) attack 
surface is a set of the sets of methods, channels, and untrusted data resources that contribute 
or can be represented by {MEs, CEs, IEs}. By combining ratios {(M:m + M:a + M:c) + (C:m + 
C:a + C:c) + (I:m + I:a + I:c)}, the result equals the total DER for a system. Attack surface 
measurements first showed potential to estimate the likelihood of an attack scenario through 
research conducted by Michael Howard of Microsoft where he proved that systems operating 
at elevated privileges were more likely to be attacked by those operating as general users. [8]     
 This study does not recommend full implementation of any of the above-mentioned 
frameworks or methodologies in the proposed framework, but each will contribute various 
elements to the final product which will be discussed in Chapter 4. Pre-Mortem Analysis 
shows great promise as a broad strategy, and studies have shown that “prospective 
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hindsight—imagining that an event has already occurred—increases the ability to correctly 
identify reasons for future outcomes by 30%”. [29] However, Pre-Mortem Analysis is only a 
blanket strategy and doesn’t offer specifics for assessing risk at the lower tiers of an 
organization. The Technical Risk Management strategy has much potential to help 
organizations succeed in their technical risk management programs, and this study feels that 
calculating Risk Cost/Time Estimates best quantify the impacts an organization could face 
based on its exposure to risk factors. The Gordon-Loeb Model best supports this study by 
justifying to top management that there should be upper and lower limits to how much the 
organization should be willing to invest in its security program, and that the benefit curve in 
increasing security investments is logarithmic. The Monte Carlo Method shows that it is 
possible to derive some sort of probability surrounding an event when no probabilities are 
even known. The Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management framework supports this study’s 
belief that the assessment should begin by identifying critical scenarios that could impact 
business or mission processes the most, and that Bayes’ Theorem could have application in 
developing probabilities for conditional scenarios or when there are significant sources of 
uncertainty. Lastly, computing a system’s DER has shown potential to serve as a quantifiable 
and cutting-edge measure of a system’s vulnerability and the likelihood of an attack on a 
particular system. These supporting methods and frameworks cannot solve the problems 
alone, as theories must still be incorporated to justify implementation of the selected 
elements just provided. The following subchapter aims to compliment and support the 
selected attributes by reviewing various theories and approaches that explain how these 
attributes will enable the proposed framework to function as intended and provide all the 
benefits previously mentioned. 
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2.4.2 Supporting Theories.  
 As stated by Clayton Christensen, “robust theories are able to explain what has and 
will occur across the hierarchy”, and that sometimes multiple theories are required to provide 
insight into the same problem. [18, p. 5] The methodologies, models, and frameworks 
mentioned in the previous sections are methods and guidelines for conducting risk 
assessments, but how a decision matures and gets reached lies in the theories applied to the 
framework. This study supports the research of four primary theories that will explain “how” 
and “why” the proposed framework will function as expected, and they are: Culture Theory, 
Decision Theory, Rational Action Theory, and Game Theory. By synthesizing these four 
theories and using cutting-edge abstraction techniques, this study can achieves its goal of 
producing a functional risk management framework that is fundamentally proscriptive, 
deterministic, and reflexive.  
Culture Theory. 
 Culture Theory attempts to describe the application of cultural filters and social 
responses in how risk is constructed, perceived, and managed. Cultural filters help us to piece 
together evidences to support our beliefs, and the two main filters are rewards and costs. [10] 
Humans are constantly bombarded with information, and without filtering this information 
we could quickly become overwhelmed. The media plays a significant role in shaping how 
we perceive the world and assess the likelihoods of events occurring. This perception can 
have positive and negative effects. An example of a positive effect could be the general 
public’s awareness of water quality and combining their voices to invoke governmental 
leaders to take action. A documented example of a negative effect occurred when fewer 
people traveled by airplane following 9-11 believing their lives were safer on the road, which 
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resulted in 1,595 extra road fatalities. [11] Donald Rumsfeld has even been quoted as saying 
that “belief in inevitability can be the cause of it”. [12] British anthropologists, Mary 
Douglas, has identified and defined four components to our society, and they are: (1) the 
fatalists that believe nature is unpredictable, (2) the individualists that believe nature is 
predictable and stable, (3) the egalitarians that believe nature is fragile and unforgiving, and 
(4) the hierarchies that believe regulation is needed to keep nature in balance. [10] All 
culture types are required to hold society in equilibrium, and oftentimes failure or catastrophe 
is needed to restore balance between the four. This study primarily examines culture theory 
as it pertains to hierarchies and their management of risk, and how society influences their 
behaviors.         
 The key characteristics of risk, as perceived and managed by hierarchies, are that 
hierarchies use science and technology to reduce risk, subordinates tend to take risks greater 
than necessary due to ignorance or incompetence, and the number of risk accidents relates to 
the amounts of risk accepted. [10] Hierarchies also believe cost-benefit tools will help them 
make the most responsible decisions, and they use codes of conduct, policies, and regulations 
to control their environments and hold these institutions together. [14] In fact, much of the 
scientific research conducted on risk is sanctioned by hierarchies in the expectation that they 
can more effectively manage risk. [10] Hierarchies must be able to distinguish themselves 
from other hierarchies because unified objective functions within a single organization help 
create a culture that reinforces the intent and priorities of the top-level management. In 
addition to maintaining cohesiveness and a common culture, hierarchies must also manage 
how they are perceived by society for survival. In governmental hierarchical organizations, 
as mentioned by Christopher Hood for the Center for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, “the 
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sort of risk that tends to matter most in government is the risk of blame”. [11, p. 63] 
Governmental organizations tend to select courses of action that will result in the least blame 
if failure occurs rather than the optimal solution. However, there are several benefits 
provided by the risk of blame: blame is a central regulator of human conduct and to observe 
social restraints, it creates incentives to behave appropriately, and most importantly keeps 
carelessness and self-gratification in check. [11] A review of Culture Theory provides 
developmental guidance for the framework by stipulating the need for a cost-benefit 
component, suggesting that scientific innovation will foster optimism, and that the possibility 
of blame must be reduced to enable rational decision-making.  
Decision Theory. 
 Decision Theory supposes that there always exists some rational purpose behind a 
decision which is either reached through descriptive or normative processes. Descriptive 
Decision Theory tries to explain how people make decisions through empirical and 
experimental observations, and Normative Decision Theory sets apart rational and irrational 
decisions. A decision is considered rational if the decision-maker selects the decision with 
greatest reason at the time of the decision. [17] Sometimes a decision is solely based on 
intuition because there is no evidence or previous experiences to base the decision upon, but 
the decision-maker assumes the risk because the results of the decision could possibly lead to 
more productive decisions in the future. Decision Theory provides several possible 
mathematical and theoretical explanations for how decisions are made.  
 There must always be one member of a collective that has the final decision, and 
Social Choice Theory, subordinate to Decision Theory, is a theoretical framework that 
explains how collective decision-making combines the inputs of various individuals to reach 
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a decision that maximizes benefits to everyone. [17] Voting procedures are an example of 
how Social Choice Theory is used to elect an official that presides over the governing body. 
Making decisions as a collective is the only way various cultures and beliefs can aggregate to 
form one unified decision. [17] Decisions are typically reached using a Decision Matrix that 
compares act, state, and outcome variables. These variables are arranged in a table that 
determines the outcome of a combination of states and actions. Outcomes are compared 
against others and then the most rational decision is reached by selecting a combination of 
acts and states that results in the most desirable outcome. [17] The superior outcome 
becomes realized when applying the Dominance Principle. Dominance exists between 
alternative outcomes if alternative (a) is preferred over alternative (b) iff (if an only if) the 
value of set {a, state} is greater than value of set {b, state}. The Optimism-Pessimism Rule 
considers both best and worst outcomes, and the alternative is chosen based on performance. 
The rule can be described through the formula (α = decision-maker’s degree of optimism, 
min = worst outcome, max = best outcome): alternative (a) is preferred over alternative (b) 
iff α * max (a) + (1 - α) * min (a) > α * max (b) + (1 - α) * min (b). [17] Transitivity is an 
important concept in Decision Theory, and is worth mentioning. Transitivity is a means of 
inductive reasoning to speed the process or provide reliable assumptions, and states that if 
alternative (a) is superior to (b) and (b) is superior to (c), then (a) must be superior to (c). [17] 
The concepts just described support this study by providing various means to assist the 
decision-maker in comparing alternatives upon presentation of the analysis, and supports the 
belief that processes should aggregate to a single point for final decision-making.   
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Rational Action Theory. 
 Rational Action Theory suggests that the intention behind an action should be morally 
constructed, benefit mankind, and lead actors to a state of equilibrium. Rational Action 
Theory also combines a model of individual action and social interaction. [15] Rational 
Action Theory makes the following assumptions that actors can: choose between different 
possible actions, assign likelihoods to outcomes, order actions and outcomes by preferences, 
and choose an action that is optimal to the decision-maker’s preferences. [15]  
 Rational Action Theory shows that empirical evidence has little effect when it comes 
to rational decision making, which is primarily driven by an individual’s utilities and 
understanding of logic. [15] Such is the case when a person is faced with deciding between 
their religious convictions (or passions) and a socially-approved rational decision. Rational 
decision-making is a very individual process, and neither science nor technology can offer 
much support. Rational Action Theory criticizes technical risk assessments by claiming: 
undesirable effects are subjective, human activities and consequential relationships are 
complex, the institutional structure of managing risks is prone to organizational failure, and 
high impact/low probability events are perceived as equal to low impact/high probability 
events. [15] Any imprecision of probabilities or likelihood estimates pose a problem to risk 
assessments in that rational action is reduced to avoidance or resiliency strategies. [15] 
Rational Action Theory also states that the decision on the value of any thresholds should be 
independent of the numerical analysis of risk. [15] These assumptions support this study’s 
suggestion that the decision variables should reflect the preferences and utilities of decision-
makers in order for them to make the decisions they feel are best for the organization, and 
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that an organization’s defense strategy should focus on its own state of security if presented 
with unreliable probabilities.    
Game Theory. 
 Game Theory ties into Rational Action Theory in that it studies mathematical models 
of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. [37] It is used to 
choose among alternatives where external forces are at play or to select business strategies 
where competition is a factor. [6] In cyberspace, there are two competitors: the defender and 
the adversary (or threat). Game Theory can be applied to level the playing field in 
cyberspace, and return some symmetry between opponents. There are many game types, but 
this study primarily concerns itself with instance-based learning and non-cooperative games.  
 In game theory, both opponents are either trying to maximize gains or predict an 
opponent’s strategy. [17] Cyber-security is a non-cooperative game that involves strategic 
interactions between the security analyst and the attacker. [8] Instance-based learning games 
are based on Instance-Based Learning Theory (IBLT), and explains how one opponent 
makes predictions on another opponent’s future behavior based on their previous 
experiences. [8] IBLT suggests the network defender should focus on recognizing the 
diagnosis and comprehension of threats while monitoring a set of network events. [8] The 
core of game theory is focusing on the consequences of decisions [15], and this mindset is 
critical to this thesis. The key assumptions under Game Theory are that all players are 
rational actors, all players know all players are rational, and players select the alternative that 
dominates others (or according to the Dominance Principle). [17] In the end and as proposed 
by John F. Nash Jr., rational players will do whatever they can to ensure the least regret. [17]  
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2.4.3 Proscriptive, Deterministic, and Reflexive Approaches. 
 Current risk management frameworks used for assessing risk exposed to federal IT 
systems are primarily a combination of prescriptive, probabilistic, and progressive 
approaches which are failing organizations in their attempts to effectively manage risk. The 
challenges of reducing subjectivity, addressing uncertainty, increasing inter-organizational 
communication, staying objective focused, enabling exploration of alternatives, and avoiding 
unintended consequences can all be alleviated or reduced by taking a proscriptive, 
deterministic, and reflexive approach instead. A proscriptive approach will assess risk as if 
failure has already occurred, help organizations identify those risk factors that lie at the heart 
of the problem, and establish risk thresholds prior to a risk decision by condemning values 
that are unacceptable to the organization. Deterministic approaches look at the circular 
relationships between causes and effects, and avoids the act of assigning probabilities to risk 
scenarios assuming failures will inevitably occur. This approach will shift intelligence 
priorities from assessing the unknown to quantifying what is known about the environment. 
Reflexive approaches link outcomes with the actions taken by an organization as opposed to 
linking the threats to the outcomes, which will help organizations reflect and evaluate the 
effectiveness of policies and procedures before developing progressive ones. Developing a 
framework that takes these contrasting approaches and applies the theories mentioned in 
Section 2.4.2 will produce a framework that is optimized for the 21st century, and help restore 
trust or faith in the institutions for those they serve which are eroding quickly as mentioned 
by Jakob Arnoldi in [14].  
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Proscriptive vs. Prescriptive 
 The assumption that a prescribed action can mitigate or reverse an outcome is a 
dangerous one, and has the potential to lead to the most severe unintended consequences. The 
reason for this danger is that decisions are made without viewing the scenario beyond the 
outcome as a failure since a prescribed action is expected to result in success, otherwise it 
wouldn’t have been chosen. Prescriptive measures require imagination, and imaginations 
have potential to run far outside the scopes of reality. When former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld was asked during a congressional hearing about his greatest fear, he replied 
by saying his greatest fear is “the danger that we can be surprised because of a failure of 
imagining what might happen in the world”. [12] In the case of the Iraq War (2003-2011), an 
action (or military campaign) was prescribed to prevent Saddam Hussein from becoming a 
greater threat to the United States or its allies. The perceived casus belli, or justification for 
war, led to many long-term unintended consequences that are still being managed today. A 
proscriptive analysis would have developed optimal reactionary measures to be taken after a 
threat was introduced by Iraq rather than developing measures to contain the threat before it 
became realized. Sir David Spiegelhater agrees that prescriptive approaches can lead to 
disastrous outcomes by stating that “an analysis of the components of an uncertainty 
statement can be illuminating, but could get too complex and over-prescriptive, which has 
possibly been a problem with otherwise admirable [approaches].” [22, p. 8] Politics have 
much to do with selecting prescriptive approaches as the federal government is under intense 
pressure to ensure threats do no find themselves in the “backyard” of U.S. citizens. [14]  
 The “imaginations” spoken of by Rumsfeld are primarily shaped through social 
mechanisms, as described by the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), and the 
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media has increased society’s sensitivity to risk. LTC Matthew Hopper feels that there is, in 
fact, a greater sensitivity to risk which has occurred because “a single voice has the potential 
to become as loud as the remaining 999,999 voices, and society has become so burdened 
with risk possibilities that it no longer puts as much effort into mitigation as required”. [M. 
Hopper, personal communication, 2016] According to Luhmann’s Abstract Theory, society is 
a communicative system [14] and communicative logic (or translation) helps stabilize society 
[16]. Since both Niklas Luhmann and Joust Van Loon have theoretically explained how 
communicative logic is developed and stabilizes society, the next step is to examine a 
framework that explains how these developments result in socially-construed conclusions. 
SARF is one such framework that attempts to deconstruct how risk is translated from its 
existence to impacts through processes of experience and communication, amplification and 
attenuation through repeated iterations, and then finally rippling across society to becoming 
perceived impacts. [14] Mass media is a prime example that validates these assumptions 
under SARF and Luhmann’s theory. Mass media is a major contributor to how risk is 
perceived by the public as this is the primary medium for how many people create much of 
their own knowledge about the world, and media outlets are under intense pressure to 
increase their viewership by grabbing people’s attention in ways that approach the border of 
unethical journalism. This problem is compounded when several outlets rely on a single news 
agency to produce the information, and these multiple outlets spin a single interpretation of 
the facts which creates an impression that the analysis being reported is truth. An example of 
how both social amplification and the media can play a role in deciding outcomes is by 
looking at a 2003 Washington Post poll that showed 69% of the American public believed 
Iraq was connected to the September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States even though 
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the federal government never stated such a connection existed. [12] This belief generated 
public support that placed pressure on politicians to select a prescriptive course of action that 
would prevent a future attack on American soil. How did 69% come to believe that Saddam 
Hussein had a role in 9-11 when there was no substantial evidence to support this belief? 
Perhaps the seeds of this belief were planted through some opinion from a news outlet 
contributor which then ran through the various processes within SARF and cycled through 
the news agencies repeatedly until the majority developed the same beliefs. This example 
demonstrates that the relationships between socially manufactured perceptions and the 
development of prescriptive measures cannot be overstated.  
 A proscriptive approach would limit developing security or defense options to those 
courses of action taken following the realization of an event or system failure by condemning 
them in advance rather than developing prevention or preemptive measures. Prescriptive 
measures are proactive, and proscriptive measures are reactionary focusing on resilience, 
robustness, and redundancy capabilities which are the primary threats to defeating a system 
as identified by risk management expert Yukov Haimes in [9]. Focusing on reinforcing those 
capabilities from a proscriptive standpoint will reduce the effects the media, social 
amplification, or our anticipations will have on us making unsubstantiated decisions that 
potentially result in the most persisting and severe unintended consequences.    
Deterministic vs. Probabilistic 
 A probabilistic approach to risk analysis assumes there is some statistical distribution 
to the data collected that enables organizations to make predictions on the likelihood of 
future events, while deterministic approaches avoid probabilities and see outcomes as 
sequences of “if-then” statements. Joost Van Loon says that trying to describe cyber-risks in 
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probabilistic terms is a futile attempt, but instead suggests that organizations ask - “What can 
cyber-risks do?” [16] In relation to risk management, Determinism is a philosophy that 
assumes that the likelihoods of outcomes are inevitable and dependent on the conditions of 
the system being analyzed. Deterministic approaches eliminate the need to assess the 
probabilities of an outcome or the effect a threat’s capabilities could have on risk variables 
since the outcome is dependent on internal conditions as opposed to external conditions. 
Assessing the threat in cyberspace is an inherently problematic and resource intensive 
process due to the small proportion of knowns to unknowns, and excluding nonessential or 
deeply uncertain variables from the framework optimizes the modeling process. Probabilistic 
approaches only optimize the modeling process if the proportion of “knowns” is significantly 
greater than the amount of “unknowns”, but the case is entirely the opposite in cyberspace. 
Therefore, the conditions that assign some quantity to the threat variable must all be the same 
because the safest assumption is that all cyber threats/entities have equal capabilities due to 
the existence of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), internet anonymity, and the threat’s 
complete disregard for legal boundaries. It is nearly impossible to assign any precise or 
accurate probabilities that a cyber threat will result in a specific outcome because the 
accuracies of probabilities are mostly dependent on the quality and completeness of 
knowledge available. Probabilities are also dependent on the distribution of the data that 
enables statistical analysis to be performed, but Marcus De Saytoy claims that the world isn’t 
random; it is chaotic. Chaos Theory states that it is impossible to predict the future, but it can 
be managed under the right assumptions. [28] In addition, focusing on consequential impacts 
through a deterministic approach enables objective risk assessments to evaluate a greater 
variety of outcomes outside physical harm alone. Since deterministic models examine 
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relationships, an example of how this multi-objective analysis could benefit risk management 
is by determining the impact one responsive strategy would have on lost production and 
degraded communications in the event of a computer virus introduction versus a probabilistic 
model that could only illustrate the probability of a virus resulting in a variety of disasters. 
Therefore individual probabilistic models would need to be constructed to examine multiple 
relationships, meanwhile all these relationships can be viewed within a single model that 
models scenarios choosing a deterministic approach.  
 Another issue with probability estimates is the relational dependence between the 
subject and object; a relationship that is based on unprovable assumptions. [11] Deterministic 
outcomes are determined by the relationships between various objects being modeled based 
on known information or strong assumptions, and then communicated by the subject. Though 
communication is a subjective action, deterministic models require less expertise in 
interpreting the data and focuses on managing the system as opposed to the “futile attempt” 
to make accurate predictions of probable scenarios described earlier by Van Loon. [16] 
Gordon and Loeb clearly state that there will never be a simple procedure to determine 
probabilities of threats or impacts for IT systems [5], and any attempt to determine these are 
plagued with challenges. Since there exists a relationship between many threats and one 
outcome [6], probabilities must be assessed for each threat to provide a general probability 
for the outcome. A deterministic model would instead exclude the threat variable and assume 
the probabilities for each outcome are the same, and alternately measure environmental 
conditions that facilitate a threat event by exploring the relationships between those risk 
variables that contribute to the scenario or the vulnerability of an organization.  
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 The optimization potential for a deterministic model increases with any reductions in 
uncertainty, and “determinism should be pushed to its very limits” as adamantly stated by 
Jack V. Michaels. [5, p. 77] Haimes claims that uncertainties can prevent risk models from 
taking on a deterministic form in most cases, but creates a catch-22 by adding that 
“uncertainty contains no reasonable probabilities”. [9, p. 227] Assuming all threats have 
equal capabilities, that all outcomes are equally inevitable at some point, and that an 
adversary’s success is mainly conditional on risk variables all renders a deterministic 
approach as the more attractive and optimal alternative. Purely deterministic models must 
also include a problematic element that critiques the quality of the data. Regardless of 
whether organizations choose a deterministic or probabilistic approach, Jakob Arnoldi of 
Aarhus University (Denmark) feels that a future society will lose faith in our ability to 
calculate risk unless we also include a reflexive approach in our risk management programs. 
[14]  
Reflexive vs. Progressive 
 Progressive risk management policies have failed to adjust to technological 
innovation because major innovations occur in nearly half the amount of time it takes to 
optimize a management process assuming the ratio remains at five years versus ten. [15] 
Progressive policies aggressively seek a competitive advantage over adversaries by 
advancing scientific and technological capabilities to surpass their opponents. Progressive 
approaches operate under the assumption that policies and processes, developed under the 
skills of subject matter experts, can control the fate of the organization by containing or 
reducing risks. However, this “containment” only creates more complex risks as their risk 
assessments uncover scenarios of greater catastrophic magnitude. Complexity forces 
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organizations to rely more and more on consolidation, compartmentalization, and 
specialization within their bureaucratic structures. [16] Organizations must deconstruct their 
bureaucracies and reflect, or organizations will reach an unsustainable limit of self-policing 
and management. A reflexive approach would reduce this complexity and improve 
optimization by evaluating the effectiveness of current policies via reflection through the 
lenses of outside actors, by further establishing checks and balances, and by conforming to 
people rather than forcing people to conform to the institution [15]. Van Loon says that 
“when we engage cyber-risks reflexively, we transcend the matter at hand” [16, p. 161], and 
this transcendence enables organizations to discover the root issues with current cyber 
policies and reflect on the ways they conduct business in the cyber domain. Additionally, 
subjects need to see themselves in the results of the analysis, but current analysis techniques 
only view results from the perspective of the organization. [15] Renowned sociologist and 
coiner of “Reflexive Modernization”, Ulrich Beck, equates reflexivity with self-confrontation 
[16] and says progressive modernization is the causal agent behind turning our society into a 
“risk society”. [14] 
 The belief that science and technology can reduce the uncertainties in risk has caused 
organizations to develop progressive strategies that attempt to avoid the consequences of risk 
rather than focusing on resilience and robustness. Several of the alternative methodologies 
mentioned earlier in subchapter 2.4 have reflexive properties in addition to resilience and 
robustness focuses. A technique by Haimes suggests that decomposing a system can reduce 
uncertainties, and decomposition is an element of a reflexive strategy where large problems 
are broken up to analyze problems of lesser granularity. [9] Phase four of the RFRM risk 
management approach reflects on the ability of each outcome to defeat the three primary 
48 
 
 
defensive properties of a system (resilience, robustness, and redundancy). [9] DER is also 
reflexive in that assessors view a system’s attack surface from the perspective of an 
adversary and the amount of effort they are willing to sacrifice to complete their objectives. 
[8] Each of these methodologies support the notion that reflexive elements are essential 
components to a combined approach to effectively manage risk. In conclusion, a combined 
proscriptive, deterministic, and reflexive approach might help organizations develop 
strategies that help them better manage risk through scientific analysis of the relationships 
between risk variables, the operational environment, and the organization.  
2.5 NIST Federal Guidelines 
 Prior to 1988, NIST was known as the National Bureau of Statistics which was 
founded in 1901 to provide standard weights and measurements in the United States. NIST 
reports to the U.S. Department of Commerce, who reports to the Executive Branch’s Office of 
Management and Budget. According to its official website, NIST’s mission is to “Promote 
U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, 
standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality 
of life.” NIST was chartered in 2009 to lead the effort in developing a new risk management 
framework, and formed the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working 
Group to meet the requirements of FISMA (Federal Information Security Management Act), 
NIST, and the office of the Secretary of Commerce. The NIST “Risk Management 
Framework (RMF) for DoD IT” was formally adopted by DoD Instruction 8510.01 in March 
of 2014, and replaced the Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DIACAP) which served as a risk management framework since 2006. 
Prior to DIACAP, the DoD relied on the Defense IT Security C&A Process (DITSCAP) as a 
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risk management framework, which was implemented in 1992 by DISA (Defense 
Information Systems Agency) under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. All three 
frameworks work (or worked) to achieve a standardized and generally applied manner to 
evaluate the security of federal IT systems.  
2.5.1 Current RMF Overview. 
 The current Risk Management Framework (RMF) is regulated by NIST Special 
Publication 800-37, and provides guidance for conducting risk assessments in Special 
Publication 800-30. The goals of the RMF are to improve security, strengthen processes, and 
encourage reciprocity among federal agencies. NIST has established three organizational 
tiers at which the RMF operates: Tier 1 - Governance, Tier 2 - Mission Business Processes, 
and Tier 3 - Information Systems. Tier 1 views risk from a strategic perspective, Tier 3 
assesses risk at the tactical level, and Tier 2 bridges the upper and lower tiers. The RMF is 
comprised of six well-defined steps that are expected to correspond to system development 
lifecycles (or run parallel to the DoD Acquisition Process, abbreviated as DAP), and take into 
account dependencies among other systems being assessed. The process begins in Step 1 by 
categorizing the information system (IS) by the IS Owner (ISO), who represents the users’ 
community and is responsible for procurement, compliance, and developing the security 
plan. This step corresponds to the development of DAP’s program acquisition information 
assurance strategy. Step 2 involves selecting security controls based on the classification of 
the system, and these are selected by the CIO and approved by the Authority Official (AO) 
who is accountable for all security risks dealing with the system being evaluated. System 
security baselines are specified under this step in DAP. Security controls are implemented by 
the ISO in Step 3 according to the architecture and requirements set by the CIO. DAP 
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translates these security controls into design requirements that will be furnished to the 
program managers for the system being evaluated, and approved at various design review 
points. The implemented security controls are assessed in Step 4, and the Security Control 
Assessor packages the assessment in the Security Assessment Report (SAR) as an executive 
summary provided to the ISO and AO. DAP develops their own test and evaluation criteria 
during this phase to ensure the implemented controls allow the system to function as 
required. Once the SAR and Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) have been reviewed 
by the AO, the system is authorized and the risk is accepted by the AO in Step 5. DAP 
officials conduct operational tests and evaluations based on the criteria set in the previous 
step during this phase. Step 6 is the final step, which involves a routine monitoring of 
security controls by conducting ongoing assessments and ensuring the system continually 
meets annual FISMA guidelines. [2] 
2.5.2 Risk Assessment Process (NIST SP 800-30). 
 The current NIST approach to assessing risk, as specified in SP 800-30 as Step 4, is 
by assigning a qualitative category (high, medium, or low) to each risk variable, with those 
risk variables being: threat, vulnerability/previous conditions, impact, and likelihood. There 
are four basic steps to the Risk Assessment process: (1) Prepare by identifying the purpose, 
scope, assumptions, constraints, and sources of the assessment. The risk model is also 
selected during this step, which provides the assessor with the risk variables to be addressed 
and the relationships of those factors. (2) Conduct the assessment by identifying threat 
sources, threat events, the likelihoods of those events to occur, the impact resulting from a 
threat against a known vulnerability. After doing so, determine the severity of risk by plotting 
the impact and likelihood within a risk matrix. (3) Communicate the Results to executive 
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management, and (4) maintain the risk assessment for subsequent reviews, audits, or future 
assessments [3]. A chart illustrating these processes and the relationships between variables 
is provided in Appendix B.  
2.5.3 Common Vulnerability Scoring System. 
 NIST endorses an alternative to assessing vulnerability as recommended in SP 800-
30, which is called the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). [43] CVSS is an 
open industry standard for assessing the severity of computer system security vulnerabilities 
that was launched in 2005 and has since been revised twice. Under this system, assessors 
calculate severity scores using a formula dependent on a variety of metrics that estimate the 
exploitability of a system and the corresponding impact. Vulnerabilities are labeled as “low” 
if the score is between 0-3.9, “medium” if the score is between 4-6.9, and “high” if between 
7-10. Quantitative inputs are still selected based on subjective judgment, but this is an 
attempt to produce results with greater precision based on six metric calculations. Risk 
management firm Risk Based Security (RBS) has been openly critical of CVSS, citing a lack 
of granularity that results in vectors and scores that are not able to distinguish between 
certain vulnerabilities or risk profiles. RBS also feels that the scoring system requires too 
much knowledge about the exact impacts caused by vulnerabilities. [44] CVSS is mentioned 
here to demonstrate the federal government’s awareness of the limitations posed by the 
current risk modeling process. 
2.6 Preliminary Survey of Problems  
 In addition to the quantification of risk, uncertainty doesn’t receive the full attention it 
deserves and should be represented as its own independent variable. John Adams describes 
the relationship between risk and uncertainty by saying that “a world without risk is a world 
52 
 
 
without uncertainty”. [10, p. 17] NIST acknowledges that uncertainty is inherent in the 
evaluation of risk and indirectly expresses it as a level of confidence against risk variables in 
[3], but uncertainty should be expressed quantitatively and independently if possible. Though 
analysts occasionally describe uncertainty in numerical terms, the inputs are often subjective 
in nature which “colors the decision process” as observed by Yukov Haimes [9, p. 27]. This 
study primarily promotes the use of objective variables in the assessment of risk, but as 
David Spiegelhalter recommends - “the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives has potential to address the limitations of mathematical models and employ the 
social sciences to close any gaps”. [22, p. 2] A functional model must combine both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques to accurately and completely describe the scenario, 
but those inputs must be separated so that each is independent of the other to avoid any 
misrepresentation. This distinction can be achieved by creating a third dimension within the 
risk model, but the model NIST recommends within its framework only supports two 
dimensions in a matrix format that limits variables (assuming independence is required) to 
either subjective or objective. All the authors examined throughout this study believe any 
form of risk exposure must be expressed quantitatively to ensure organizations make 
decisions responsibly; this belief includes a quantified representation of uncertainty.  
 The true state of the system will never be fully described unless the issue of 
uncertainty is appropriately addressed, and every account of uncertainty within the model 
actually improves the overall process. [9] The NIST approach conducts assessments as if the 
state of the world is static throughout and some period after the assessment. Assessors have 
to overcome this limitation by making predictions on the future state of the object being 
assessed, but as Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle states - “elements of any system within 
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an environment are constantly in motion and moves in response to measure it”. [10, p. 29] 
The NIST-governed assessor must take into account future variability, the latency period of 
threats, and the compounded effects of threat combinations in addition to the state of things. 
[10] Muddling through all these complexities makes assessing risk extremely challenging for 
a human mind to account for every required variable to produce a precise estimate of risk 
exposure. These complexities amass to create a problem that is so perplexing that even a 
team of people may never be able to fully solve. Robert Glass’s Law of Complexity illustrates 
how added complexity compounds the problem, as every 25% increase in problem 
complexity results in a 100% increase in solution complexity. [38] Sometimes uncertainty is 
so great that the assessor lacks the confidence to even assign a subjective weight to a risk 
variable. This situation essentially forces the assessor to either ignore the risk contributor or 
assign a weight randomly; for example, through MCM. There are significant issues with 
either concession, and unfortunately this predicament happens quite frequently. An 
alternative to the previously mentioned compromises is to represent uncertainty objectively 
through mathematical processes and remove the burden from the assessors of expressing 
their confidence in the analysis. As an example, suppose one assessor is correct and 
expresses a high degree of confidence in his prediction about the future while another is 
extremely cautious in his expressions. The correct assessor is initially perceived as ludicrous 
and any request for funding is limited to the understanding of the decision-makers, but the 
conservative assessor is viewed more favorably and receives his full request for funding. 
Following a catastrophe, both assessors will be criticized for either failing to clearly 
articulate their confidence or for being too extreme. Both scenarios are linked to uncertainties 
that exist among all actors, and approval is ultimately up to the decision-makers. These two 
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examples go to show that decision-makers should be presented with factual data while 
representing uncertainty numerically in a separate dimension so they can form their own 
conclusions and assume responsibility for the decision with a higher degree of assurance. By 
using the current approach, in the end, the decision-makers are left to choose between their 
own incomplete understandings of the problem or to settle with the assessor’s confidence in 
their assessments when selecting a risk option.  
 Another systematic issue with the current framework is that it fails to unify the 
organization under a single decision process, and there is little transparency for how 
decisions are reached at each level. The current process is a more “us versus them” situation, 
or functional siloing, where a department’s needs takes priority over organizational needs 
and conflicts of interest exist internally within tiers of the organization. These issues could be 
reduced by increasing transparency across the organization, and by developing a process that 
maximizes participation and communication between decision levels. U.S. Army commander 
LTC Matthew Hopper agrees that people in organizations can sometimes become slightly 
detached from the organization’s priorities and primary mission as risk management 
processes continue. [M. Hopper, personal communication, 2016] The organization’s chosen 
risk management process needs to function as though participants are part a team, and 
productive teams communicate effectively. Communication is critical between levels of 
decision-making such that cross-level processes operate as a network, and the flow of 
communication is constant. Input taken at each level creates a more accurate picture and 
meaning of the world as seen from various views. This process can be supported through 
Luhmann’s Abstract Theory that compares communicative systems to the human 
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consciousness where every observation contributes to a unified cognitive state of the 
organization. [14]   
 Another problem with the current framework recommended by NIST is the lack of 
opportunity for decision-makers to introduce their own criteria for establishing thresholds or 
to define risk variables according to values that link to their utilities. The current model is 
already set by the parameters provided, and the thresholds are already defined as to what 
constitutes “high, medium, or low”. Decision-makers are ultimately the ones who accept 
responsibility for a decision, and it should be up to them to decide what values are considered 
unacceptable versus predefined risk categories of the output. Chancy Starr said in Science 
Magazine (1969) that “there is no absolute threshold for when risks of a technology should 
be accepted”; deciding on a threshold should rely more on values and ethics rather than facts. 
[14, p. 34] There are cases when risk variables plot in the “high” category, but a high risk 
decision is still made. Would it not be better if the criteria were set as either acceptable or 
unacceptable up-front? Failure to clearly establish defined acceptability criteria can result is 
extremely unfortunate outcomes or cause a relaxing of ethics such as the case with Ford’s 
1971 decision in regards to the Pinto. The NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration) established safety criteria that required all vehicles be able to withstand an 
impact at 30mph without leaking fuel. During Ford’s testing, it was revealed that the Pinto 
was a fire risk if another object collided with its rear under the thresholds set by NHTSA. A 
cost-benefit comparison showed that the cost of modifying the design would exceed the total 
amount of lawsuits Ford would face over the lifecycle of the brand. [39] This example clearly 
illustrates that determining thresholds at the conclusion of the analysis is just as illogical as 
leaning upon predefined thresholds.    
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 A final problem with the current model is how risk variables are presented to the 
decision-maker. The NIST model categorizes risk variables in advance, and then it is up to 
decision-makers to mentally convert the results into their own utilities which is extremely 
challenging. Utilities are variables that quantitatively represent factors that contribute to an 
individual’s meaning of success [15], and are the basis for how decision-makers determine 
which alternative is preferred over another by linking the presented decision variables with 
their own utilities. By clearly defining decision-makers’ utilities up-front, assessors can tailor 
the analysis to them and reduce the load of conceptualizing these interpretations which could 
help guide the analysis. The current model helps describe risk exposures, but fails to link risk 
variables to a decision-maker’s utility, which might encourage him or her to explore the data 
further or recognize the effects one alternative decision could have on another by modifying 
the parameters. With the current model, the assessor must manually perform a completely 
new analysis with each environmental change or with each introduction of a new variable 
required by top-management, but a superior model is real-time, mobilizes thresholds, 
conforms to the values of decision-makers, and permits decision-makers at each level to 
adjust the parameters until an acceptable outcome is realized.  
 The challenges of reducing subjectivity, addressing uncertainty, increasing inter-
organizational communication, keeping organizational teams objective or mission focused, 
enabling exploration of alternatives, and avoiding unintended consequences can all be 
alleviated by choosing a combined proscriptive, deterministic, and reflexive approach. In 
addition to these approaches, pushing objective assessments of cyber risk to its limits 
produces a framework that will enable decision-makers to make more well-informed 
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decisions, reduce overall complexity, and function optimally for organizations in the 21st 
century. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE PROBLEM 
“We should not be victims of risk, but active managers of it.” ~ Mary Beard, 2010 
 
 Just as Mary Beard’s quote suggests in [11, p. 15], organizations are increasingly 
finding themselves as the victims of risk management rather than successful managers of 
risk. Many institutions have unintentionally become victims by developing programs that 
allow assessors to make subjective determinations on the risk likelihoods and impacts to 
which their organizations are exposed. These subjective judgments combine individual 
biases, perceptions, and/or personal convictions to create inputs that vary greatly from 
individual to individual. To demonstrate the variability between expert opinions, a case study 
was conducted by David Spielgelhalter on panel members prior to the 2007 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by asking them to assign qualitative 
categories that express their confidence in modeled data prepared for the conference. His 
study found that the scientists’ judgments lacked consistency and that each interpreted the 
categories differently. [22] Though expert opinions generally vary, obtaining the correct 
answer is achievable through collective reasoning if there are sufficient participants included 
in the survey. Marcus De Saytoy demonstrated this possibility in his documentary “The 
Code” by asking 160 individuals to guess the number of jelly beans in a jar of over five 
thousand. Though some guesses were either grossly over or under-estimated, the group of 
160 were able to collectively estimate within a very small margin of error the accurate 
number of jelly beans in the jar just as he had predicted. [28] This is the problem with 
subjective assessments; it requires a cost-ineffective number of participants to collectively 
make decisions with any real precision. NIST recommends the use of qualitative over 
quantitative assessments due to the simplicity, cost effectiveness, and lesser need for 
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expertise in making those assessments. [3] NIST makes this recommendation under the 
assumption that only a single individual or a small team will assess an exposure, but it would 
require a far greater number of assessors to precisely estimate risk exposure for any system. 
The trade-off might be a more cost-effective tool for assessing risk, but subjective analytical 
techniques lack the precision needed to accurately assess and forecast risk.  
3.1 Purpose and Goals 
 The primary purpose of this study is to suggest an alternative to the current RMF used 
by the DoD that maximizes the use of objective variables to minimize complexity and enable 
decision-makers to make the most rational decision based on logic as opposed to shaping 
opinions around subjective recommendations filtered at multiple tiers within the 
organization. A secondary purpose is to make optimization a central priority in the risk 
management process. Optimization is the goal of minimizing costs while maximizing gains, 
and the assumption behind an optimization problem is that the consequences of decisions are 
taken into account for future policy options. [9] In order for this framework to achieve its two 
primary purposes, it must meet several goals. A proposed framework would synthesize 
selected elements of Game Theory, Cultural Theory, Rational Action Theory, Decision 
Theory, and effective visualization techniques in order to: (1) simultaneously examine 
multiple objectives of the organization, (2) limit bias and subjectivity during the assessment 
process by converting subjective risk contributors into quantitative values using tools that 
measure the attack surface and adversarial effort, (3) present likelihood and impact as real-
time objective variables that reflect the state of the organization and are grounded on sound 
mathematical and scientific principles, (4) aggregate and function organization-wide 
(strategic, operational, and tactical) with maximum transparency, (5) achieve greater 
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representation of the real scenario and strive to model future scenarios, (6) adapt to the 
preferred granularity, dimensions, and discovery of the decision maker, and (7) improve the 
decision-maker’s ability to select the most optimal alternative by reducing the decision to 
rational logic. The final product will be a recommended successor to the current framework 
as “RMF 2.0”, and companioned with a Decision Support System (DSS) to aid 
implementation, maximize transparency and communication, and keep members operating 
within the bounds of the framework. A detailed implementation for achieving these seven 
goals will be provided in subchapter 4.1.   
3.2 Hierarchies and Risk  
 The failures of all large empires and organizations have resulted either from defeat by 
adversaries, or expansion to a point of complexity that rendered them impossible to 
effectively manage. LTC Matthew Hopper feels organizations reach a tipping point when 
“they can no longer win against their opponents”. [M. Hopper, personal communication, 
2016] Extending capabilities enable organizations to seize advantages and succeed over their 
competition. In a similar context as mentioned previously, Robert Glass’s Law of 
Complexity also states that there is a 100% increase in complexity for every 25% increase in 
capability, and increases in complexity cause increases in risk as well. [38] Hierarchical 
organizations expand their bureaucratic structures to manage both the additional complexities 
and risks induced from increasing their capabilities. The DoD is such an organization, and 
there are extensive challenges within the management of risk by hierarchical organizations. 
There are steps that these types of organizations can take to reduce these challenges, but the 
issues that produce these challenges must be addressed first.  
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 Maintaining a hierarchical organization in a democratic society is a balancing act that 
tries to meet the expectations of its customer base or community, while achieving its 
principal objectives in a cost-effective manner. The organization must also exert sufficient 
influence to shape the conduct and behaviors of its employees without driving them away. 
Without any limitations, hierarchies would expand to the point where they start to represent a 
“Kafkaesque Nightmare” where harsh measures must be imposed on members of an 
institution to maintain organizational control and influence. Another challenge is by trying to 
select the alternative that meets the requirements of Pareto’s Improvement where a decision 
can be made that makes the maximum number of people better off, and no one worse. [10] 
Though this is the goal, it is often not the case as there remain some losers even though the 
decision reached is for the good of the majority. Disproportional and unfair outcomes occur 
because organizations are diverse, and every member has his or her own set of opinions and 
values. This diversity presents a challenge to organizations when decisions must be made. 
Organizations can attempt to unify people by creating a climate and culture that is understood 
and practiced by all.  
 Perhaps the greatest challenge faced by hierarchical organizations is the management 
of blame. Federal organizations tend to develop strategies that avoid blame, and this 
avoidance can powerfully shape the structure, processes, and activities within them. [11] 
Occasionally the more rational choice is also the choice that could result in the greatest 
blame if unintended consequences were to occur, but blame avoidance can outweigh any 
positive credit if the rational choice were chosen. [11] A proposed risk management strategy 
must enable federal organizations to select the most rational decision and avoid the blame, 
and this can be achieved by basing the decision off of pure logic by describing decision 
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variables in objective terms which can then be shown numerically to be the superior option. 
Subjective assessments currently used by the federal government cannot achieve this, so 
appointed officials or military officers are indirectly forced by their constituents to avoid 
blame. These decision-makers can achieve greater flexibility and shift the opprobrium by 
altering the conditions of the risk analysis and the environments of their organizations. The 
conditions needing the most focus are rationale, logic, and the objectification of risk 
variables which open organizations to approaches that may solve many of their most difficult 
risk management challenges.  
3.3 Subjective Assessments of Risk 
 The 1983 Royal Society said “there is a need for better estimates of actual risk based 
on direct observations of what happens in society” [10, p. 8], and Lord Kelvin said “anything 
that exists, exists in some quantity and can therefore be measured.” [10, pg. 10] Assessing 
risk objectively (or quantitatively) differs from subjective (or qualitative) analysis by 
interpreting empirical or actuarial data as a means to measure the risk exposure an 
organization faces in the likelihood a negative consequence were to occur due to an activity, 
event, or behavior. Additionally, objective modeling will permit new observations to update 
the risk model without having to rerun the assessment process. Objective assessments also 
provide the opportunity to compare gains vs. losses, and to evaluate the most optimal and 
logical decision among a number of alternatives. Optimizing the decision is selecting the 
alternative that imposes a minimal cost while maximizing benefits for the organization [16], 
which is fundamental in rational action and decision theories as stated by the Maximax Rule 
(reference Optimism-Pessimism Rule). [17]  
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 Psychometric studies have shown that decision-makers prefer objective assessments 
over subjective ones due to the ability to weight the likelihoods of future successes as given 
by Prospect Theory [15], and one of the primary objectives of this study’s proposed model is 
to maximize the analysis and presentation according to the preferences of the decision-maker 
over time. LTC Matthew Hopper agrees that decision-makers ultimately prefer quantitative 
over qualitative assessments, though he feels both have use in making recommendations to 
superiors. LTC Hopper also feels that there should be separations between subjective and 
objective analyses to prevent one from influencing the other, and quantitative breaks should 
be clearly defined if used in the model. Whichever model is chosen, “it should enable 
decision-makers to put their energy into the right things”. [M. Hopper, personal 
communication, 2016]  
3.3.1 Subjective Limitations. 
 To emphasize the limitations of subjective judgments, imagine a person were 
standing within proximity of a ramp’s release point with a large metal ball at the top and the 
person had to choose between estimates of where the ball should land based on mathematical 
analysis or another’s “expert” guess. The rational individual would select the mathematical 
analysis because a tested equation has shown the strongest evidence for performing as 
expected. Of course many other variables outside the equation might not be taken into 
account (for example: wind speed, temperature, etcetera), but these variables are minor and 
an assessor could still estimate within close proximity of where the ball would land. This 
example illustrates the complexities and limitations of subjective analysis; subjective 
assessments are incapable of measuring risk outcomes with any acceptable precision. In 
addition to precision, the proximity of the subject to the object has an effect on the decision 
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made. The person at the end of the ramp would care little how the trajectory of the ball is 
modeled if the person were far outside any hazardous range of the impact area. Subjective 
determinations are heavily influenced on an individual’s proximity to the risk factor, which 
creates additional problems within an organization as conflicts of interest arise. The problem 
becomes even further compounded when multiple subjective variables are combined, which 
causes the model to venture further and further from reality. Even in reasonable cases where 
subjectivity can be applied, there are still too many situations where poor definition or 
ignorance prevents the assessor from making an estimate without any high level of 
confidence. [11] When confidence is challenged, implementing a Brier Scoring Rule can help 
calibrate people for decision making and discourage them from exaggerating their confidence 
through a penalty system. [11] Subjective assessments, semi-quantitative assessments 
included, can also create a false sense of security or doom. If the true probability of a 
catastrophe is 51%, then an assessor might assign a “very likely” qualitative category to that 
outcome based on the assessor’s perception or intrinsic value system. A “very likely” 
estimate communicated to the decision-maker, without raw numbers, might cause him to 
interpret this category in a probability range between 70-90% based on his own utility 
functions or prior experiences. This scenario removes some ability from the decision-maker 
to make a rational and logical decision to accept or disapprove an alternative for which he or 
she will have to take responsibility in the event the decision leads to a catastrophe. A 
subjective assessment of risk by a single assessor functions properly when there is proof 
beyond reasonable doubt that an event or activity will lead to a specific outcome. [14] 
Unfortunately, this is rarely the case when risk is assessed against federal IT systems as a 
high degree of uncertainty and variability exist among the variables that contribute to cyber-
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risks. Another significant limitation with subjective assessments involves the how to 
investigate fault following a catastrophe caused by a previous decision. It is difficult to blame 
any assessment that developed conclusions based on an aggregation of many individual 
opinions. The expertise of the individual submitting the opinion could be challenged, but it is 
ultimately the decision-maker that must fall on the proverbial sword for the decision made. 
Therefore subjective assessments expose the decision-maker to undue risk, but if the decision 
were based on objective data, then blame would shift to the distribution, calculation errors, or 
plain misfortune. The intelligent decision-maker understands the risk associated with 
subjective assessments, and most will exercise additional caution when presented with 
alternatives. This caution often results in decisions with greater reliability that might have not 
been the most rational or optimal choice, but would protect him or her from the consequences 
of assuming greater risk. Aggressive strategies are occasionally needed to gain superiority 
over the competition, but decision-makers take on additional risk if they accept strategies 
based on recommendations developed through subjective analysis. A final limitation to 
subjective assessments is the inability to rank and order multiple risk scenarios without a 
broad range of qualitative breaks. Typical models in federal risk assessments only assign 
three or four categories to likelihoods and impacts which will result in many scenarios having 
the same risk classification. An objective assessment results in scenarios with specific 
numerical assignments that are unique among others; a subjective alternative being the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System endorsed by NIST. (Reference subchapter 2.5.3) 
Though subjective assessments are severely limited and challenged in their approaches, 
objective assessments maintain their fair share of challenges.   
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3.3.2 Subjective vs. Objective Challenges.  
 Just as with subjective assessment, objective assessments come with their own 
challenges and these must be overcome before quantitative modeling can provide 
organizational benefits superior to qualitative modeling. Objective modeling requires 
information about the variables to be known as historical facts or observable, and the data 
distribution must be such that analysis of the information can make strong assumptions based 
on the evidence presented. When variables cannot be described objectively, subjective 
assessment methods must make up the deficit. Such is the case when human lives are at 
stake, or a decision-maker is trying to decide between what they are willing to pay or willing 
to accept. Ethical conflicts may prevent the assignment of values to a single human life, 
however an accepted value can be placed on the ability to affect probability of death. The 
formula for determining the value of a human life is r = (1/Δp)x, where r = change in risk, Δp 
= change in population, x = range in values. (Note - This method breaks down as (p) 
approaches zero.) [10] This formula is one example of how ethical decisions, often only 
reached through subjective mechanisms, can be reasoned through objective means. Often in 
the cyber-domain, there isn’t enough information available or the variability is too great to 
provide statistical or mathematical relevance. Therefore an objective assessment must restrict 
data collection to variables of known or measurable parameters. As mentioned before, the 
variables must have some sort of relationship or link to the decision-makers’ utility in order 
for them to interpret the results into some form that supports a rational and logical decision, 
and a model is only as good as how nearly it represents the real world. Modeling the real 
world within cyberspace is a challenging endeavor, and Van Loon says that “there are no 
pure forms of cyber risks; there are only mutations and deviations” which we can only sense 
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“in its distribution or consequences”. [16, p. 160] Tackling this challenge, in an objective 
sense, will require risk management programs to consolidate vast amounts of information 
and focusing the analysis on assessing the consequences of an impact rather than describing 
the impact. An additional challenge is an expression of confidence in numerical analyses, as 
was described in the beginning of this chapter, where confidences varied in modeled data 
relating to climate change. There will always be a point where an objective risk assessment 
must transition to subjectivity for final judgment despite the level of detail in an objective 
analysis. This is the case when socioeconomic values, politics, or intelligence must 
synthesize with the objective analysis of the risk variables to produce decision thresholds 
according to the needs of the organization and the decision-maker’s instrumental rationality. 
[17] Objective functions set by the decision-maker only succeed if there are common values 
and agreements across the organization, and this creates an additional burden to the 
organization, which must invest large amounts of energy into shaping its culture to counter 
the broad range of diversity that often hinders decision-making. Sometimes this effort is 
unachievable, and objectives must be reduced to measurements, such as money and time, that 
have a universal understanding to ensure risk exposure is universally perceived across the 
organization. A model that overcomes these mentioned challenges and supports the objective 
assessment of technological or cyber risks will enable organizations to progress into the 
modern world’s next epoch - Post-Modernism.  
3.4 Post-Modernism  
 Prior to the modern age, the industrial revolution (or pre-modernism) was 
characterized by man discovering ways to harness the elements of nature and his collective 
capabilities to expand industrial output, and to make products and goods accessible to the 
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vast majority through commercial innovations. Pre-modernism was succeeded by 
modernism, which emerged as technology and science discovered application in modeling 
techniques to control the effects of natural or human phenomena. According to Ulrich Beck, 
the found ability to control these phenomena is what ultimately created our “risk-society”, 
which as David Garland warns is dangerously “spinning out of control”. [14] Many of these 
risks generated through modernization never eventually become realized, yet they are 
capable of causing widespread panic or concern. An example of this occurrence happened 
during the rush to ensure computers didn’t crash globally following the changeover of 
computer clocks at the start of the new millennium which could have resulted in less panic if 
society were more reflexive in its modernization strategy. Reflexive Modernization is when 
we confront the risks that are fabricated and introduced by society [14], and this 
confrontation is necessary to reduce the complexities that hinder progress. Eventually this 
phase will pass, and society will transition to post-modernism where we begin to have 
productive conversations about risk by synthesizing multiple theories across various 
domains, questioning the actual value of progress, and analyzing all the information collected 
from previous lessons to form a new model for dealing with the uncertainties and risks 
society will face. This new model or paradigm will signal the end of modernism, and usher in 
a new school of thought to help us cope with the 21st Century and the Post-Modern period. 
3.4.1 Effects of Modernism. 
 In modern times, perceptions of new threats and catastrophes are being conceived 
more quickly than society has time to react and manage these realizations. Society places an 
enormous amount of pressure on politicians to solve our problems because the complexity of 
problems has become so great that individuals are incapable of assessing risks alone. The 
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evaluation of food and drugs is one such example of where government regulators are needed 
to verify the safety of products because citizens do not have the expertise or time to make 
these conclusions for themselves in addition to all the other threats that pose a hazard. Once a 
food or drug has been classified as “safe”, citizens can consume these products with 
reasonable assurance that their safety has been essentially guaranteed. One of the primary 
motivations behind modernism is to overcome any scarcity or need, but this cyclical effort 
resulted in developed technologies that came with unanticipated costs. [16] This cycle 
created a surplus of risks and costs that now far exceed the original benefits those 
technologies were intended to bring. In addition to coping with these risks and costs, citizens 
must develop skills to utilize these new technologies. This began around the mid-20th 
Century when magazines began including sections that provided demonstrations on how to 
put these new technologies to use. Since this point, individuals have developed personalized 
curriculums to self-educate themselves on everything ranging from household appliances to 
computing technologies. Internet Computing Technologies (ICTs) energized this 
development when individuals gained access to almost limitless amounts of information. 
This Google and Wikipedia-fueled boom helped expand this revolution, and created a new 
phenomenon called the “Death of Expertise”. [40] The “death of expertise” is incredibly 
dangerous and represents the collapse of dialogue and trust between professionals and non-
professionals. The dangers of this collapse become evident when diseases, once thought 
eradicated, re-emerge due to the opposition to vaccines supported by non-professional 
bloggers. Social media has also enabled individuals to amplify their voices and discount the 
advice of experts by “becoming as loud as the opposing 999,999”. [M. Hopper, personal 
communication, 2016] Prior to social media, it was difficult to quickly generate an 
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opposition or unify a small cultural sub-set due to communicative limitations or regulated 
media. The elements of social deconstruction and globalization have combined to form the 
process of individualization. Individualization is a process to achieve and maximize 
fundamental freedoms, and this process has hindered society’s ability to collectively reflect 
and respond to ideas. Ulrich Beck defines individualization as “a process of dis-embedding 
from a person’s social environment, and embedding into a world ordered and revealed by 
technology”. [16, p. 26] There have been several responses to modernism, and two of those 
are unfettered capitalism and religious fundamentalism. [15] Both oppose modernism, but 
ironically embrace the capabilities introduced by it. Modernism has also led to an erosion of 
trust between science and religion where each are in constant competition, and this erosion 
has led people to trust neither and seek out the answers for themselves which has further 
accelerated the process of individualization. This cycle must end otherwise the social fabric 
that unifies us all will fall apart, but there are academics who believe the qualities that 
characterize a post-modern period will enable society to find stability and security for the 
future. Before we can get there, there are several challenges that must be overcome. 
3.4.2 Transitional Challenges.  
 The primary challenges to overcoming the problems created by modernization and 
transitioning to a period of post-modernism are finding solutions to reducing the effects of 
compounding complexities, the process of individualization, and the growing challenge to 
expertise. As each new risk materializes, a separate function or specialization is required to 
contain this risk, and this rate of growth in risks corresponds to advances in technology. 
Reflexive Modernization is essential in reducing the complexities created by risk 
materialization by confronting these risks early in development. The deconstruction of 
71 
 
 
systems, bureaucracies, and identities could also help to reduce complexity by turning larger 
problems into smaller ones and solving those smaller ones individually. A model that adjusts 
to the granularity of the problem is one such technique. Post-Normal Science, as suggested 
by Jakob Arnoldi in [14], is another suggestion to reducing social complexities by presenting 
values to the public as opposed to assumptions because trust is lost in the experts when their 
positions or conclusions shift. Post-normal science would also alleviate the challenges 
presented by individualization. Individualization is unlikely to cease expanding, and because 
of this process people desire to see the information for themselves, self-educate on the risk 
variables, and then compare their own analysis against the recommendations or conclusions 
of experts. This cross-comparison leads into the third and final transitional challenge where 
society must find a common balance between non-professionals and professionals. The need 
for experts that specialize in various specialties will never disappear, but neither will the 
public’s desire to understand how these experts formed their conclusions. Accepting the 
following terms between the common person and the expert will enable both to succeed in a 
post-modern world: (1) the expert isn’t right 100% of the time, (2) the expert is more likely 
than the common person to be right in their area of specialization, (3) expertise is a result of 
certified education and a wealth of experience, (4) a common person’s understanding of a 
specialty cannot surpass that of the expert simply by browsing the web, and (5) the common 
person’s analysis will always have less value than the expert’s in the eyes of an outsider. [40] 
When asked how capable common people are in drawing effective conclusions for 
themselves using the information available, LTC Hopper feels that “that reliance on expertise 
will always be necessary for good decision-making and is crucial practices in making sound 
judgments.” [M. Hopper, personal communication, 2016] By overcoming these challenges 
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and developing a framework that synchronizes the multiple risk management theories and 
approaches mentioned throughout this study, it will become possible to create a model that is 
equally functional, objective, and optimal for those assessing risk in the post-modern world.  
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CHAPTER 4. PROPOSED SOLUTION: RMF 2.0 
“Good examples are like bells calling to worship.” ~ Old Scandinavian Saying 
  
 The principal cause for monumental change in an organization is the proof of a 
concept that demonstrates potential for gained efficiency and optimization. [15] An optimal 
risk management framework must include a model such that the three fundamental questions 
of risk management are most efficiently and accurately answered, and again they are: (1) 
what can go wrong, (2) what is the likelihood that it could go wrong, and (3) what are the 
consequences? The current framework recommended by NIST attempts to present a cost-
effective model that reveals the answers, yet the framework unintentionally introduces 
problems that increase complexity, propagate uncertainties, and decrease the ability to 
forecast the consequences of available policy options. Additionally, the current framework 
requires a far greater number of assessors to precisely estimate risk exposures than available, 
fails to address uncertainties that could further describe the true state of the system being 
analyzed, fails to unify the organization under a single decision process, lacks the 
opportunity for decision-makers to create their own thresholds or define variables according 
to their terms, and doesn’t allow the decision-maker to abstract or explore the data in real-
time, in order to gain insight into the dependencies between risk management options. 
Abating these problems can be accomplished by maximizing the use of objective variables 
thereby reducing complexity, and making optimization a central priority as opposed to 
strengthening unprovable assumptions. This process requires implementing an approach that 
has the combined characteristics of proscriptive, deterministic, and reflexive methodologies 
and applies selected assumptions under culture, decision, rational, and game theories to 
develop a framework that will meet the needs for hierarchical organizations today and in the 
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foreseeable future. This chapter also introduces a Decision Support System (DSS) concept 
with potential to aid implementation, maximize transparency and communication, and keep 
members operating within the bounds of the framework. The synthesis of these processes, 
theories, and an accompanying DSS merge to present a successor to the current RMF 
outlined in NIST SP 800-37; the successor being “Risk Management Framework 2.0”. 
 The primary objectives of the RMF developed by NIST are to improve information 
security, strengthen processes, and encourage reciprocity among federal agencies. [2] The 
proposed framework builds upon these objectives, and introduces concepts that enables 
organizations to: (1) simultaneously examine multiple objectives, (2) limit bias and 
subjectivity during the assessment process by converting subjective risk contributors into 
quantitative values using tools that measure the attack surface and adversarial effort, (3) 
present likelihood and impact as real-time objective variables that reflect the state of the 
organization and are grounded on sound mathematical and scientific principles, (4) aggregate 
and function organization-wide (strategic, operational, and tactical) with maximum 
transparency, (5) achieve greater representation of the real scenario and strive to model future 
scenarios, (6) adapt to the preferred granularity, dimensions, and discovery of the decision 
maker, and (7) improve the decision maker’s ability to select the most optimal alternative by 
reducing the decision to rational logic. Proposed solutions to meeting these additional 
requirements will be provided in the following section to show how objective risk assessment 
strategies, through a combined approach, enables the framework to reduce complexity and 
orient organizations towards optimization.  
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4.1 Requirements.     
1. Simultaneously examine multiple objectives. 
 The traditional risk-matrix model recommended in NIST SP 800-30 only enables 
organizations to examine multiple objectives through discussion or more complex modeling 
techniques, while the methods and model proposed here will convert organizational priorities 
into consequential impacts that have potential to prevent the organization from meeting its 
objectives through deterministic analysis. As opposed to a probabilistic model, a 
deterministic model will enable the organization to fully understand the scenario by 
discovering relationships between environmental conditions and consequential impacts, and 
how each of these risk factors reciprocate across the organization based on selected 
alternatives. Organizational objectives have different priority among individuals, but 
applying assumptions under Culture Theory can help organizations discover solutions to 
managing these conflicts of interest. One assumption is that each member under the culture 
theory model possesses a small window of truth and can contribute to the analysis. 
Contributions from every member of the framework will ensure proposed policy options 
reciprocate among various departments under the hierarchical organization. Multiple 
objectives must be taken into account for everyone to feel connected to the analysis and the 
results, otherwise members of the framework become detached from the problem based on 
their own proximities or self-interests. Another assumption is that organizations must 
maintain a culture that is conducive to finding a balance or agreement on the values of the 
organizational objectives. This culture can be reinforced through the framework by including 
a mechanism that causes members to repeatedly engage the mission and priorities of the 
organization. The re-engagement of organizational priorities coupled with a deterministic 
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risk analysis strategy make the examination of multiple objectives a viable and optimal 
modeling solution.  
2. Limit bias and subjectivity during the assessment process.  
 Subjectivity is created through the uncertainties, biases, and perceptions that plague 
risk assessments, and every metric evaluated in the current risk model are based on the 
unprovable assumptions of the assessor. Subjectivity can be reduced by limiting risk 
measurements to those contributors that can be measured objectively based on actuarial or 
empirical evidence (such as events logs, damage reports, or attack surface), and by shifting 
priority from strengthening assumptions to optimizing processes. The Info-Gap Procedure is 
one such process included in the framework that proposes that the decision-making body 
avoids modeling risk factors that are highly uncertain (for example, a threat’s capabilities), 
and instead focuses on satisfying critical requirements and exploiting favorable opportunities 
through an analysis of objective variables. [22] A refined understanding of uncertainties is 
often sought through social discourses, and the Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
(SARF) provides an explanation for how risk is translated from its initial realization through 
resultant outcomes. A study of the SARF process benefits the model by developing 
subjective filters that influence how risk is interpreted and communicated across the 
organization, and ensuring that only objective observations influence any modeled severity of 
risk. Perhaps the most amplified and exaggerated variable in risk analysis is the threat 
variable, and assuming all cyber threats have equal capabilities ensures more robust and 
resilient strategies are developed and implemented. Perceptions of risk cause members to 
develop prescriptive measures that are expected to mitigate an outcome, but these measures 
create a false sense of security. The alternative is to develop proscriptive measures that result 
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from a pre-mortem analysis, where members assume a failure has occurred and determine the 
steps needed to return the organization to full operational capacity. The framework supports a 
proscriptive strategy by addressing these catastrophes prior to the analysis rather than during 
or towards the conclusion of the analysis. Objective analysis does have its limits in 
cyberspace, and this study suggests representing these variabilities (or lesser degrees of 
uncertainty) in an independent dimension using Bayes’ Theorem, Confidence Intervals, 
Expected Values, Poisson’s Distribution, or the Monte Carlo Method for numerical 
representation. All of these methods have potential to represent the strength of data 
distributions within the proposed model, and the decision as to which method has the greatest 
utility in quantifying uncertainty should be left up to decision-makers, either by considering 
any offered recommendations or based on their prior experiences. A Brier Scoring Rule 
could be added to the framework to supplement an effort to manage the perceptions of its 
members, by penalizing assessors for valuing risk variables outside the scope of reality. In 
addition to quantifying uncertainty in statistical or theoretical inferences, the framework can 
limit subjectivity and bias by limiting modeling to objective variables, managing the 
perceptions and expectations of members (or penalizing them), and by taking a proscriptive 
approach.   
3. Present likelihood and impact as real-time objective variables. 
 Any effort to model risk must be grounded on sound mathematical and scientific 
principles, and an assumption under Culture Theory states that hierarchical organizations 
operate under the conviction that science and technology give them the ability to control 
phenomena that threatens them. Since scientific principles are grounded on factual 
observations, any effort to model risk must therefore be based on a current or historical 
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analysis of objective risk variables. The three variables considered objectively in the 
proposed model are: vulnerability, likelihood, and impact; excluded from the model is any 
direct representation of the threat variable due to deep uncertainties. Uncertainty is 
considered as an additional variable, but numerically represented in an independent 
dimension due to subjective and/or random properties. (See Table 2) All of the variables 
Table 2. - NIST vs. Proposed Risk Variable Definitions 
 
Table 2. 
 
 provided in NIST SP 800-30 are evaluated solely based on assumptions, while the proposed 
variables are objectively derived measures of each contributor to the risk scenario. 
Vulnerability is assigned as a system’s or organization’s susceptibility to a threat scenario by 
comparing the attack surface of a resource against the amount of effort needed to defeat that 
resource. Likelihoods are assigned by multiplying the resource’s vulnerability with its value 
to the adversary. Impact is assessed as a measure of cost incurred by the organization in 
terms of recovery time or cost estimates if the catastrophic outcomes were to occur. These 
recovery cost/time estimates are reduced by combining any redundant capabilities for an 
organization’s net recovery cost. Plotting the likelihood (X) and impact (Y) variables model 
the state of the organization as if the threat outcomes had occurred. Each of these variables is 
modeled in real-time, based on empirical or actuarial observations, and synchronized with a 
database or other repository to reflect the most accurate state of the organization. This 
framework does so in order to answer the Royal Society’s call for “better estimates of actual 
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risk based on direct observation” by making every effort to limit the evaluation of risk to 
objective variables only. 
4. Aggregate and function organization-wide with maximum transparency.  
 Overall risk is an aggregation of risk measurements, and a proposed framework must 
function such that risk is seen from the perspectives of others to construct a larger or smaller 
picture of the risk scenario. This is achieved by maximizing transparency throughout the 
decision process and promoting maximum communication across tiers within the 
organization. Every member of the framework must be part of the process, and able to realize 
how their input contributes to other processes within the framework. The framework 
achieves this goal by unifying the process under a single DSS that is server-based and 
accessible to anyone participating in the process. Transparency is essential for frameworks to 
function in the post-modern period due to processes of reflexivity and individualization. An 
approach considered reflexive would assume that successful decision-makers attempt to view 
the problem from the perspectives of others, and that members of the organization desire to 
see themselves in the results of the analysis. Under a single platform that unifies the decision 
process, members at different tiers can witness processes at levels below and above them, 
and understand how their inputs impact the results of the analysis as presented to the 
decision-maker. Members could feel like they are being marginalized by the process or the 
decision-maker could fear the reactions of subordinates from a decision, but a transparent 
decision support system would reasonably moderate both of these scenarios. 
5. Achieve greater representation of the current and future scenarios. 
 The validity of a model is the level at which it accurately represents the real system or 
scenario, and the ability to model future scenarios is dependent on any distributions that can 
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be extracted from past data and/or to the degree direct observations affect future outcomes. 
The RFRM framework suggests that a Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) is the most 
accurate representation of the current risk situation [9], and includes an established set of 
requirements that enable the organization to succeed. This procedure is also the first phase of 
the RFRM methodology, and is carried over to the framework proposed by this study where 
those requirements are inversed as consequential impacts that prevent success. There is a 
general belief that complexity brings the model closer to reality, but this assumption is a 
common fallacy. Assumptions fill gaps that objective analyses cannot fill, and both 
assumptions and complexity are reduced by maximizing objective analysis. An alternative to 
making assumptions in the absence of exploitable data distributions is by using the Principle 
of Insufficient Reason where a probability is derived by dividing a fixed probability of 100% 
by the number of possible outcomes for a single event. This assumption is also a 
deterministic in nature, and deterministic assumptions further remove uncertainty by 
studying the relationships between previous organizational states, actions, and outcomes 
versus the relationships between a future threat and outcome. Assuming that the next state 
depends on the current state and actions chosen is a hypothesis under the Markov Decision 
Process, and helps model the future by maximizing the use of prior information to predict 
outcomes. [19] An additional challenge with determining the future is to reduce the effects 
observation has on the outcome or actor perpetuating the threat as a result of the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle or the Hawthorne Effect. A framework that considers the fourth axiom, 
under the four “Next Generation Cyberdefense Axioms” proposed by Chris Williams where 
active defenses are configured such that attackers may enter a system but cannot proceed 
beyond a certain point, would limit the effects observation has on a threat. [27] Additionally, 
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creating a greater distance between the subject and a threat-object reduces this impact. 
Greater distance is achieved by excluding the threat variable, and focusing on the conditions 
or states of the organization instead. Since research should be independent of practice, 
intelligence agencies should still gather as much information on threats as possible and 
perform threat analysis in parallel with a risk analysis for risk-control development and 
evaluation as opposed to allowing threat variables to influence the risk model. All of these 
assumptions and techniques help contribute to a proscriptive and deterministic approach 
where the most undesirable outcomes are conditionally guaranteed, the current scenario is 
more accurately represented, and modeling the future is a less resource-intensive effort.    
6. Adapt to the preferred granularity, dimensions, and discovery of the decision maker.  
 A model that adapts to the preferences and utilities of the decision-makers will 
compel active engagement by them. By establishing values for utilities (or diminishing 
utilities) and through an assumption under Rational Action Theory, an action should be 
chosen that is optimal to the decision-maker’s preferences. Preferences include how the 
model presents the analysis, where thresholds are set, and how variables are defined. This 
study proposes that the optimal opportunity to establish preferences is prior to the analysis to 
ensure variables can be evaluated as they link to the decision-makers’ utilities. The decision-
makers will have a list of options for representing their utilities, and three examples of these 
options are an expression of his or her subjective utility, expected utility, or an application of 
their optimism-pessimism estimates. The decision-makers also have the option of removing 
risk variables that they feel lack relevance or relation to the decision. It is fair to leave this 
choice up to decision-makers, since they will have to answer for any outcomes, but the 
variables must be clearly defined before any are selected or removed for relevance. A model 
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primarily tailored to decision-makers will encourage exploration when the results of the 
analysis are presented, which will enable them to fully understand the magnitude of the 
problem, and discover dependencies between conditional outcomes and the impact current 
decisions could have on future policy options. This exploration is made exclusively possible 
by incorporating a DSS that allows the decision-maker to modify the parameters or visually 
compare options within a single model. Deeper exploration is allowed by adjusting the 
granularity of various risk scenarios and deconstructing the agreed upon risk factors into 
contingent risk factors that form the aggregate scenario. Potential for this deeper exploration 
and more will be demonstrated in the DSS concept later in this chapter. 
7. Reducing the decision to rational logic. 
 In order to meet the final requirement, organizations must maximize the use of 
objective variables and apply a cost function to responsibly compare alternatives. The cost 
function must produce a variable that has universal value to everyone operating within the 
framework, and the two most universally understood values are time and money. Game 
Theory assumes that rational players select the alternative that ensures the least regret and 
dominates all others, and Rational Action Theory assumes that a rational ordering of actions 
is based on the decision-maker’s understanding of logic. The most logical alternative is also 
the most optimal, and the optimal alternative is the one that imposes minimal cost while 
maximizing benefits for the organization. The proposed framework presumes discovering 
minimal cost is achieved by selecting the most cost-effective control that meets the aims of 
the decision-makers, and maximum benefits are achieved by implementing controls that 
reciprocate among multiple risk factors and reduces risk severity under the thresholds 
established prior to the analysis. Assumptions under Game Theory are applied where the 
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organization tries to understand the rationality of the adversary, which is quantified by 
performing a cost-benefit analysis (i.e. DER) on behalf of the threat to determine the 
likelihoods of outcomes. Risk Cost/Time Estimates are used to enable decision-makers to 
compare alternative courses of action. Combinations of DER and risk time/cost estimates 
represent the state of the organization for each scenario, and comparing these states with 
various available courses of action reduces the decision to rational logic. Alternative courses 
of action are compared using the Dominance Principle, an assumption under Decision 
Theory, where one action and state combination are proven to dominate another. The 
decision with the least regret is the choice that remains most logical and optimal over periods 
of time, and this is achieved by demonstrating the potential that one decision could influence 
another with respect to time. Ultimately, exchanging probabilities for DER to represent 
likelihood and removing subjective analysis provides decision-makers with maximum 
flexibility to make a decision according to their own preferences and understanding of the 
scenario. 
4.2 The Process 
 RMF 2.0 is a decision and approval process that can be initiated by anyone within the 
organization where the problem is presented to upper management for a decision on whether 
to pursue a course of deeper analysis. This is a cyclical process where Tier 1 first establishes 
priorities and risk thresholds, Tier 2 then produces risk factors that threaten business or 
mission processes, and Tier 3 assesses risk based on the current state and conditions of the 
organization. Following Tier 3’s assessment, the analysis is presented to Tier 2 for review of 
the current security plan and the opportunity to prepare recommendations for Tier 1. Tier 1 
reviews the analysis and Tier 2’s recommendations, and then makes a final decision based on 
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what is presented. (See Figure 3) These steps are described in much greater detail in the 
following section.                 
 
Figure 3. - Decision Flow 
4.2.1 Nine-Step Process.  
  “RMF 2.0” is a collaborative nine-step decision process that models the 
susceptibility of the organization to a risk scenario and the expected performance of various 
security or policy options, thus allowing decision-makers to abstract the information and 
make comparisons according to their preferences. (See Table 3) This process begins at Step 1 
by identifying a need for risk analysis and defining the subject or system to be analyzed. 
Definition of the subject or system includes classification, categorization, and a detailed 
explanation of the system’s security requirements. These definitions enable Tier 1 to process 
Step 2, which involves establishing priorities to be kept in mind throughout the analysis and 
the decision-maker’s preferences on how the analysis is to be conducted. Highly uncertain 
risk variables are removed from the process through an information-gap analysis during this 
step. (Reference Info-Gap Procedure) Once priorities and preferences have been established 
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by Tier 1, Tier 2 conducts a business/mission impact analysis in Step 3 that produces 
consequential impacts most severe to operations in the form of an HHM. This analysis is 
conducted from a pre-mortem perspective that assumes failure has occurred, and determines 
the consequential impacts that led to this failure. These impacts become the risk factors that 
guide the analysis conducted at Tier 3. Step 4 involves determining all the organizational 
resources that support the business or mission functions at risk, and assigning a likelihood 
variable to each of those resources through an objective assessment of each individual DER. 
Once likelihoods have been evaluated, Tier 3 then links existing security controls or policies 
from NIST SP 800-53 (“Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems”) to 
each organizational resource in Step 5. The effectiveness of each control is determined as 
either its contribution to modifying the adversary’s DER or reducing the recovery cost 
following a failure related to one of the risk factors developed in Step 3. Tier 3 then conducts 
an impact analysis in Step 6 where the impact is described as a Risk Time (or Cost) Estimate 
for the amount of time or money it would take to recover from any one of the consequential 
impacts developed by Tier 2 in Step 3. Once the impact analysis is complete, Tier 3 submits 
the analysis to Tier 2 for review.  It is at Step 7 where Tier 2 reviews the current security 
plan, and compares existing security controls against available controls. Additional controls 
are selected or existing ones removed in this step as Tier 2 determines which controls are 
optimally suited to defending the organization against a particular risk factor. Tier 2 then 
submits their recommendations to Tier 1 for final approval at Step 8. This step is when the 
most optimal course of action is revealed to the decision-maker as all decision variables and 
tacit knowledge merge to form a personal aggregated assessment of the risk scenario. Step 9 
is a continuous process, following final approval, where the security plan is constantly 
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reflected upon for changes in the environment or conditions that might alter the assessments 
of impact or likelihood. A suggested synchronization strategy between DAP and RMF 2.0 is 
provided in Section 5.3, Stage 5.  
Table 3. - NIST RMF vs. DAP vs. RMF 2.0 (w/ Applicable Organizational Tiers) 
 
 
4.2.2 Model Output. 
 The proposed risk model’s output is projected onto a two-dimensional plane, where 
the X and Y axes represent Likelihood and Impact respectively. (See Figure 4) The two 
additional dimensions of Uncertainty (or statistical inferences) and Time are represented as 
(z) and (t) independently so as to not disassociate the former variables from the data source. 
Uncertainty is graphed as a radius extending from the {X,Y} plot of the risk factor being 
evaluated that represents the variability among the objective data. If the decision-maker 
prefers, there are alternative methods to measure uncertainty which will be provided later in 
this chapter. Time is a fourth dimension that represents the projected change in risk over 
time, and there is also an opportunity for Tier 2 to plot periods of time that cover critical 
missions where risk is expected to peak. Classes of risk are categorized as either 
“Unacceptable, Discretionary, or Acceptable” as opposed to NIST’s suggested use of “High,  
Medium, or Low”, and definitions of these thresholds are unique to each analysis as decided 
by the top decision-maker. 
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Figure 4. - Risk Model 
 In a representational sense, data abstraction is one of the most critical processes in 
communicating and articulating risk to top-tier decision-makers. This study suggests that 
abstracting the data according to these guidelines mentioned above will help: (1) gain the 
attention of audiences, (2) enable audience members to retain information, and (3) influence 
behaviors within the organization. The proposed model achieves the first aim by illustrating 
trends in risk along lines of magnitude and clearly identifying those risk scenarios that are 
most unacceptable to the organization. The model achieves the second aim through its 
simplicity and its clearly defined thresholds on a two dimensional plane. The third aim is 
achieved through impactful and effective presentation that provides every member operating 
within the framework with an understanding of the significance of each policy selected. 
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Categorizing risk scenarios as either “Unacceptable, Discretionary, or Acceptable” further 
reduces biases or disagreements. Modeling risk in these manners will additionally enable the 
model to illuminate hidden patterns, hold attention, inspire, and promote exploration. [25]  
 The primary decision-maker would not be able to select the most optimal alternative 
if the model were not able to abstract various relationships or were not tailored to his or her 
preferences. These preferences for model presentation are established prior to the analysis, 
and models risk such that the scenario can be viewed from multiple perspectives as the 
analysis is conducted at various tiers within the organization. Representation of uncertainty 
(or statistical inference) and the criteria that defines the thresholds are also both established 
by the decision-maker prior to the analysis. Defining these model attributes beforehand helps 
guide and shape subordinates’ perceptions as if they were viewing the model through the lens 
of the decision-maker. Monetary cost is one of the most critical decision variables, and this 
model aligns cost thresholds with acceptability thresholds which estimates the amount of 
monetary capital needed to shift all the variables in one risk category to the lesser threshold. 
Modeling risk according to the preferences of the decision-makers will generate greater 
engagement, help establish universal understanding, enable objective association, and 
enhance the ability to forecast future impacts. 
4.2.3 Framework Importance.  
 The value of this new framework is that it addresses the NIST model’s oversights of 
optimization, complexity, and uncertainty through an objective approach that quantitatively 
answers the three questions fundamental to all risk assessments. Returning to the Gartner 
Maturity Model mentioned in Chapter 1, this framework enables organizations to select the 
most optimal cyber-defense strategy among a number of alternatives where the competitive 
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advantage is assumed over adversaries. The optimal strategy is selected by comparing the 
cost-effectiveness of various implementations to determine which strategies provide 
maximum benefit at a minimum cost. Competitive advantage in the cyber-domain isn’t 
reached when one opponent is able to defeat their opponents, but when one opponent has 
developed an understanding of how to maximize their exploitation of available tools and 
capabilities. Additionally, this framework unifies the organization by increasing cooperation 
and transparency between different hierarchical levels in the decision process, and by 
enabling members to see how their analytical contributions impact the risk model. 
Unification is furthered through a mutual understanding of the priorities and values of the 
decision-maker. Since the organization’s state is objectively described and values are 
universally understood, there is little opportunity for the assessor to inject personal bias or 
subjectivity into the analysis. Objective analysis also reduces uncertainty and complexity, 
whereas subjective assessments may combine many layers of arguable assumptions as 
opposed to the data speaking for themselves. These benefits and more are all achieved 
through a combined proscriptive, deterministic, and reflexive approach that synthesizes 
elements of various theories for maximum utility in the post-modern era. 
4.3 The Decision Support System 
 A Decision Support System (DSS) is a computer- based information system that 
supports organizational decision-making activities. It is suggested as a model-driven 
companion to the proposed framework to aid implementation, unify the organization under a 
single decision process, record all transactions for later inspection or review, and keep 
members operating within the bounds of the framework. The three fundamental components 
to a DSS are the database, the model, and the user interface. [41] The DSS must take several 
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design factors into consideration in order to be effective: (1) work analysis, (2) memory 
limitations, (3) attention spans, (4) cognitive processing abilities, and (5) decision-making 
abilities. [19] Work analysis is how the DSS frames and explains the decision variables such 
that they enable the problem to be most accurately described. The DSS must also ensure that 
processes are compartmentalized such that analysts and decision-makers aren’t overwhelmed 
or become confused by the problem because too much readily available information can 
exceed the memory or attention capacity of members. The DSS must also provide visual aids 
that explain the variables or train members on some of the complexities associated with the 
programming. Additionally, the DSS must reinforce current procedures that correlate to the 
way members execute processes, and this issue is corrected by implementing a forcing 
mechanism that causes all members of the framework to revisit previous processes and the 
decision-maker’s set of priorities before proceeding. The DSS considers all these challenges 
and guides organizational members through the nine-step framework proposed under RMF 
2.0 to ultimately enable organizations to determine the most optimal defense strategies for 
their risk management programs.   
4.3.1 RMF 2.0 DSS Walk-Through.  
 The RMF 2.0 DSS is a server-based user-friendly collaborative tool that is completely 
transparent and accessible to everyone operating within the framework. The initiator creates 
the form using the template provided by first naming the decision process according to the 
nature of the problem to be analyzed. (See Figure 5) Next, the initiator includes the most 
current mission statement for the organization which will be revisited by every member that 
provides input or reviews this document. The initiator also provides the points of contact for 
each member representing the tier’s approval authority in Step 1 - “Select ORG Tier”. These 
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names are synchronized with an email database so that the leadership at each level are 
notified of upcoming or completed processes. Prior to every process or update, contributors 
  
Figure 5. DSS Steps 1-3 
 
must return to Step 1 to select their operational tier so that the mission and priorities listed in 
the next step are reinforced. Once the form has been prepared and leadership at each tier has 
been identified, the form is passed to an appointed representative in Tier 1 to insert the 
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priorities and utilities of the highest decision-maker in Step 2 - “Set Priorities and DM 
Utility”. Utility Factor can include a mathematical formula (for example, Subjective Utility 
Function or Diminishing Utility) that diminishes or increases values over time, or any other 
intrinsic value system of the representative’s choice. Another utility option is to apply the 
Optimism-Pessimism Rule where the decision-maker offers his or her degree of optimism (or 
confidence) to be applied to each objective variable. Once Step 2 is complete, the form 
remains with Tier 1 so that the decision-maker can define risk and cost thresholds for the 
most relevant objective variables in Step 3 - “Set Risk Thresholds”. The decision-maker also 
has the option of selecting how uncertainty will be represented in the modeled output. 
Examples of representation could use Poisson’s Distribution, Bayes’ Theorem, or Confidence 
Intervals to illustrate certainty based on either historical records or expert opinion. For 
convenience, the decision-maker also has the option of using handles to drag or expand each 
risk category as opposed to manually entering the acceptability criteria. The flexibility in 
Step 3 might not always be exercised, but according to LTC Matthew Hopper “the ability to 
customize the analysis might not be needed with each decision, but the ability would still be 
preferred.” [M. Hopper, personal communication, 2016] Once the decision-maker has 
established the parameters of the assessment and is comfortable with the representation, the 
Tier 1 authority clicks “Approve” and the form is routed to Tier 2 to process Step 4 - “Set 
Timeframe and Risk Factors”. (See Figure 6) This step includes setting a reasonable 
timeframe for the analysis, developing risk factors that threaten mission or business 
processes, and optionally identifying critical missions during the assessment period. The risk 
factors are developed using a proscriptive approach that views risk outcomes as failures 
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through pre-mortem analysis. There is no limit to the number of risk factors or critical 
missions that can be identified, and each input created is displayed within the model. Tier 2  
 
Figure 6. - DSS Steps 4-5 
 
also has the option of selecting a number of glyphs for each risk factor that best connects the 
subject to the issue; for example, a building glyph to represent a risk factor of 
physical damage to headquarters. Once Tier 2 has reached an agreement on the risk factors of 
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Step 4, the appointed authority clicks “Approve” and the form is routed to Tier 3 to complete 
Step 5 - “Assess Vulnerability and Likelihood”. The goal of Step 5 is to determine the 
likelihood that each resource that supports the business or mission process identified in Step 
4 can be defeated. This likelihood is not a probability, but a numerical representation of the 
Damage-Effort Ratio (DER) and relative value for that particular resource. The DER is a 
vulnerability measure of the attack surface of a resource divided by the amount of effort 
needed to defeat it, and then multiplied by the value of the resource to the adversary; value 
corresponds to the classification or mission priority of the resource. Resource vulnerability 
can be assessed manually or through an attack-graph algorithm that measures the attack 
surface and adversarial effort for network-connected resources. (See Figure 7) Once Tier 3 
has completed Step 5, the assessor “Set’s Existing Controls” in Step 6. (See Figure 9) The 
assessor begins this step by clicking on the “Control Worksheet” button, which opens a 
separate document that provides all the controls provided in NIST SP 800-53 and provides 
space to manually enter custom security controls. (See Figure 8) Clicking on the “Control 
Reciprocity” button creates an additional column in the worksheet that enables the assessor 
    
             Figure 7. - Attack Graph              Figure 8. - Control Worksheet 
to show reciprocity between single controls and multiple risk factors. The worksheet also 
provides the expected performance of each control as to how effective they are at preventing 
defeats. Once the form is completed, the assessor enters the number of security devices 
deployed and the number of personnel (PAX) required to administer that control. The 
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assessor clicks “Approve” once an inventory of security controls is complete, and moves 
onto Step 7 - “Assess Impact and Review”. Tier 3 assesses impact as a function of recovery  
 
Figure 9. - DSS Steps 6-7 
cost or time multiplied by the amount of operational degradation the risk factor will impose 
upon the organization based upon previous occurrences. If the impact hasn’t occurred before, 
then the assessor collaborates with other departments to determine what it would cost the 
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organization to return to operational capacity should the event take place. As impacts are 
assessed, these variables are combined with the likelihood estimates produced during Step 5  
to model the risk scenarios provided by Tier 2. The assessor can also view the total  
 
Figure 10. - DSS Steps 8-9 
 
investment of the security program as a combination of monetary and human capital. Once 
the assessor is confident in the accuracy of his or her input, the assessor clicks “Approve” 
and “Submit for Review” which routes the form to Tier 2 to develop recommended controls 
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in Step 8 - “Review and Recommend Controls”. (See Figure 10) The Tier 2 representative 
opens up a control worksheet similar to the worksheet used by Tier 3 to compare alternatives 
and create recommendations. (See Figure 11) The primary difference between the two  
 
Figure 11. - T2/1 Control Worksheet 
 
worksheets is that Tier 2’s worksheet shows the annual cost of each control. A side-by-side 
cost comparison is shown in the process window that compares the current security 
investment and the additional investment required to implement the recommended controls. 
The model shows the change in future risk, and is based on the demonstrated performance of 
various controls. Once Tier 2 has approved their recommendations, the form is routed to Tier 
1 to complete Step 9 - “Finalize Assessment”. In this portion of the document, the decision-
maker is presented with a table showing the recommended controls to reduce the impact of 
various risk factors and a model showing comparisons between recommendations and the 
current security plan. Decision-makers can open Tier 2’s control worksheet and modify their 
recommendations based on a deeper analysis of the variables that contribute to the risk 
scenario. Decision-makers can also select, de-select, or create additional dimensions at this 
point to help them gain a better perspective of the scenarios represented in the model. They 
can also double click on each risk factor to adjust the model’s granularity showing how the 
individual resources plot on the graph according to their likelihoods and impacts following 
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defeat. Decision-makers can additionally toggle through different representations of 
uncertainty to compare the estimates of various methods. Once the top decision-maker is 
comfortable with the analysis and fully understands the potential impacts of his or her 
decisions, then the form is finalized and available for everyone to review. The form and all 
transactions are archived to enable future inspection, review, or further updates. Since the 
document is synchronized with a cyber-event database, it can live and update risk according 
to any changes occurring in the environment that could affect the risk variables. (See 
Appendix B for detailed walk-through.) 
4.3.2 DSS Objectives. 
 The primary goals of the DSS are to facilitate decision-making, educate decision-
makers on the various contributors to risk, and enable them to explore the model to find the 
most optimal solution while keeping members operating within the bounds of the framework.  
Many of the processes that model the data and performs analytics are invisibly executed by 
automated systems, and there are guides throughout the form that educates members of the 
framework on the various risk variables and available security controls. Much of the analysis 
is objectively collected from various databases that are synchronized with the DSS to 
maintain authorizations, evaluate the effectiveness of controls, and model the risks. The 
reliance on automated data collection processes reduces complexity by lessening the need for 
assumptions; every input is based off historical data, empirical observations, or a thorough 
cost-analysis. Integrating a DSS into the framework additionally reduces the complexity of 
the risk assessment by enabling everyone to visualize their contributions to the risk model, 
thus proving as far superior to current methods recommended by NIST. The following 
chapter will compare both the NIST framework and the DSS-reinforced framework in a 
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detailed evaluation of twenty characteristics generally agreed upon by the risk experts as 
most essential to any organizational risk management program.  
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CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATION and CHALLENGES 
“In the end, risk is linked to mission assurance.” ~ Russell Fenton, 2016 
 
 The proposed framework is an effort to link organizational risk to mission assurance 
through an objective means that focuses on optimization, reducing irrational decision-
making, and improving collaboration for those hierarchical organizations evaluating risk in 
the post-modern world. Implementing this framework would require a complete overhaul of 
the way risk is perceived and appropriately managed by organizations, but whichever 
framework organizations implement must link risk to mission assurance as a fundamental 
requirement.  
 The purposes of this chapter are to provide an evaluation of the proposed and NIST 
risk management frameworks, identify a number of the challenges organizations may face 
upon adoption, and finally provide a sequential course for eventual adoption. The evaluation 
portion of this chapter compares the two frameworks in a side-by-side comparison across 
twenty characteristics that have generally been agreed upon as most essential by risk experts 
to demonstrate superiority. The next portion highlights some of the many analytical and 
hierarchical challenges that could hinder implementation, and how these can be responsibly 
overcome. The implementation section lays out a logical five-phase “way forward” strategy 
that provides direction in an organization’s effort to shift to a more deterministic, 
proscriptive, and reflexive approach to managing risk. This thesis and chapter will conclude 
by providing a few of my own personal reflections developed throughout the course of this 
project, explaining what initially inspired this effort, and lastly sharing my optimism in the 
event that the DoD sees the same importance I see in shifting the way risks are assessed in 
the cyber domain.  
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5.1 General Evaluation 
 What makes the proposed framework superior to the framework recommended by 
NIST? In addition to meeting NIST’s three primary objectives and the seven key 
requirements outlined in Chapter 4, the framework must exhibit twenty characteristics that 
this study suggests are necessary to make any proposal a viable successor. 
These characteristics are provided in Table 4 below, which is a comprehensive review of 
those framework properties considered by the experts as most critical. The current 
framework recommended by NIST meets seven of the twenty characteristics, while the 
proposed framework was designed to satisfy all twenty. These twenty characteristics attempt 
to alleviate the risk management challenges of: complexity, subjectivity, managing 
uncertainty, forecasting future impacts, regulating indifferences, linking preferences to the 
presentation, real-time analysis, and discovering dependencies between risk variables.  
Table 4. - Characteristics of an Effective Risk Management Framework 
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1. Answers “YES” to the 3 fundamental questions. Impacts on future decisions clearly 
understood: The NIST RMF and RMF 2.0 both meet the first characteristic of an effective 
framework, but NIST’s risk model fails to reveal the relationships between current decisions 
and future impacts resulting from those decisions. This analysis is achieved in the proposed 
model by demonstrating the change in risk over time relative to the future state of the 
organization following implementation of the security plan. 
 
2. Holistic and comprehensive by addressing and prioritizing HW, SW, ORG, Environmental, 
and Human failures/risks: The two frameworks both attempt to meet the second 
characteristic by addressing and prioritizing all known sources of risk, except the proposed 
framework tries to combine many risk scenarios under one consequential impact to business 
or mission functions.  
 
3. Represents the “real world”, hierarchal structure of the ORG, and behaviors over space 
and time: The NIST framework fails to meet the third characteristic, while RMF 2.0 
considers risk factors as impacts to business or mission functions as actual risk to the 
organization under a single model that represents the consequences of multiple risk scenarios 
as they affect every tier under the hierarchical structure over space and time.   
 
4. Takes into account all non-inferior and inferior scenarios and solutions: RMF 2.0 meets 
the fourth characteristic by accounting for all scenarios through a proscriptive and pre-
mortem analysis by assuming failure has occurred and considering all the contributing factors 
to those scenarios. These failures are the results of many scenarios, and every available 
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control (or solution) is assessed for its ability to manage the consequences. Additionally, the 
incorporation of attack-graph algorithms will analyze and enumerate almost all potential 
paths to defeating a system.  
 
5. Based on firm technological foundations and uses all available tools in risk measuring 
activities; assessment process is of empirical, quantitative, objective, and scientific 
approaches: The fifth characteristic is met by RMF 2.0 from measuring the state or previous 
states of the organization, which allows the flexibility of multiple interchangeable 
measurement tools and techniques to compare alternative solutions. The proposed framework 
is scientific in that variables are constructed based on objective observations, and analyzed 
using accepted mathematical techniques to illuminate patterns or distributions that can help 
organizations make reasonable assumptions about the future. 
 
6. Uses mathematic and scientific principles to determine likelihoods of risk scenarios: The 
NIST approach is completely based on subjective assumptions, while RMF 2.0 collects 
actuarial or empirical evidence to draw conclusions or support assumptions. Likelihoods are 
represented as a scientific measurement of vulnerability versus the value of all applicable 
organizational resource to an adversary. Mathematical formulas and theories are applied 
against the data to prove statistical relevance or measure the degree of certainty in sound 
assumptions. 
  
7. Involves the entire ORG in the ID and mitigation of risk, and motivates and rewards 
personnel: Both frameworks meet the seventh characteristic, but RMF 2.0 is more 
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collaborative and generates greater engagement of decision-makers through transparent 
decision processes by tailoring the assessment to their preferences. Transparency is a means 
to reward or motivate personnel where their contributions or best judgments become realized, 
which reinforces responsible and logical decision-making. 
 
8. Recognizes the importance of top-level commitment and publishes policies related to risk 
management: Both frameworks meet the eighth characteristic, but RMF 2.0 requires greater 
involvement in the process and engagement from top-level organizational leadership. 
 
9. Strives to meet multiple objectives and balances competing objectives; avoids lumpiness: 
RMF 2.0 meets the ninth characteristic and evaluates multiple objectives simultaneously 
through a deterministic and objective approach, and allows everyone to contribute to the 
analysis. Lumpiness is avoided by providing space in the DSS to input every contributor to 
risk and providing the opportunity to deconstruct each risk factor into individual resources 
that support the business or mission function at risk.   
 
10. Separates and clearly defines state (quantitative) variables and decision (qualitative) 
variables: The tenth characteristic is met by RMF 2.0 by creating independent dimensions for 
subjective or statistically generated variables to prevent them from influencing the 
measurements of objective variables. 
 
11. Effectively enables Organization to reduce risk to acceptable levels based on Risk 
Determinate Factors (RDF): RMF 2.0 achieves the eleventh characteristic where 
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acceptability thresholds are established through a prioritization of efforts to reduce risks 
based on intrinsic and extrinsic values of various organizational business or mission 
functions. RDFs are used during impact analysis to assist calculating risk time or cost 
estimates in the event of a failure or compromise.  
 
12. Resistant to the subjectivity and perspectives of the analyst and presents only the facts to 
the decision maker: The twelfth characteristic is met by RMF 2.0 by limiting the analysis to 
objective variables, and reserves subjective analysis to its own dimensions for final decision-
making.  
 
13. Effectively manages uncertainty and adequately presents (quantifies) uncertainty as a 
decision variable: RMF 2.0 succeeds in the thirteenth characteristic by presenting a variety of 
mathematical options for optimally representing uncertainty within the model. This third 
dimension is modeled such that the decision-maker can estimate the range of consequences 
following a decision, allowing decision-makers to effectively decide if the alternative lies 
within their bounds of acceptance.  
 
14. Practical, logically sound, adherent of evidence, and open to evaluation: Both 
frameworks achieve characteristic fourteen, but RMF 2.0 achieves greater adherence to 
evidence by relying on objective variables to evaluate risk. 
 
15. Compatible and effectively communicates risk across the entire organization: Both 
frameworks achieve characteristic fifteen, but RMF 2.0 extends this capability by unifying 
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the process under a collaborative and completely transparent DSS. The DSS is also outfitted 
with guides and allows decision-makers at each level to explore the analysis for more 
informed decision-making. 
 
16. Conducive to learning, reproducible, and transparent: Both frameworks achieve 
characteristic fifteen, but RMF 2.0 maximizes transparency by allowing everyone with 
access to the DSS generated form to view every process executed at every level.  
 
17. Presents the optimal amount of information to decision makers to enable them to make 
best decisions for the ORG: The NIST framework fails to achieve characteristic seventeen by 
presenting unprovable assumptions to the decision-makers, while RMF 2.0 allows decision-
makers to determine the optimal amount of information, based on objective variables, needed 
to make a rational decision for their organization.  
 
18. Appropriate weights are assigned to contributing factors and optimization coincides with 
model construction: NIST lacks characteristic eighteen due to the inability to assign specific 
weights to variables, while RMF 2.0 models risk based on objective variables that provide 
specific measurements. RMF 2.0 also views the problem from an optimization perspective 
where alternatives are selected based on their ability to provide maximum gains at a 
minimum cost.  
 
19. Effectively weighs costs versus benefits, indexes severity appropriately, and takes into 
account variability/sensitivity: RMF 2.0 achieves the nineteenth characteristic by calculating 
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a cost variable that compares the organizational expenses associated with each cyber-defense 
strategy to evaluate cost-effectiveness. The proposed framework also mobilizes risk 
thresholds that are tailored to the decision-maker’s willingness to accept risk, and deploys an 
additional dimension to represent variability in the data to further refine decision-making. 
 
20. Innovative, based on explicit assumptions and premises, and attuned to the needs and 
policies of the organization: The twentieth and final characteristic is met by RMF 2.0 
through integration of a flexible and collaborative DSS, which automates the objective 
assessment of risk variables as they impact the current and future states of the organization. 
 
5.2 Challenges 
 Author Clayton Christensen has said that “solving challenges in life requires deep 
understanding of ‘what’ causes ‘what’ to happen”. [18, p. 16] In order to gain this deep 
understanding, organizations must develop approaches that combine selected elements of 
multiple theories to explore the problem to its fullest and discover the relationships between: 
(a) conditions and outcomes, (b) the assessor and the object being analyzed, (c) current 
decisions and future impacts, and (d) between the organization and the environment. The 
discovery challenges posed against these relationships can be broken down into the following 
three categories: (1) objectivity, (2) analytics, and (3) hierarchical organization challenges. 
Each of these categories will be explored further in the following three subsections.  
5.2.1 Objectivity Challenges. 
 Objective analysis (1) can describe the four relationships mentioned above, but this 
approach in the cyberspace domain is challenging due to the many uncertainties present and 
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the difficulty determining returns on investment (ROI) in cyber security. In order for federal 
organizations to appropriately manage uncertainties and determine any returns on their 
security investments under an objective risk management strategy, members need to operate 
under the assumptions that: (1) true risk is the impact to business or mission functions; not 
the scenario itself, (2) an assessment of threat capabilities greatly increases the complexity 
and reduces the reliability of a risk assessment, (3) the most rational and logical alternative is 
the one that can be quantitatively shown to be superior according to the decision-maker’s 
preferences, and (4) the likelihood of a successful cyber-attack is conditional and relative to 
the state of the organization rather than the offensive capabilities of the threat. Creating and 
instilling these mindsets for any organization willing to adopt the proposed framework will 
be a great challenge, but this study expects organizations will achieve greater success in their 
risk management program by implementing an objective risk assessment strategy. The DoD 
will not be able to view their ROI in a manner similar to the private sector, but can instead 
view returns in the discovery of an optimal security implementation and any capital savings 
gained.  
5.2.2 Analytical Challenges. 
 The analytical challenge (2) to an objective assessment is modeling the data in such a 
way that the relationships between the four relational pairs become revealed to members of 
the framework for effective decision-making at each level. The primary challenges to 
analytics, relative to RMF 2.0, are: model reliability, sufficient data, observation effects, and 
the development of scientific controls to validate modeled data. Model reliability is heavily 
influenced by the characteristics of the algorithms used to quantify attack surfaces, 
coincidental vs. intentional impacts, deep uncertainties, the percentage of threats captured by 
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identified consequential impacts, and the ability of different permutations to produce similar 
results. Further research will be required to develop strategies that effectively normalizes the 
influences of these situations. Objective analysis requires a collection of actuarial or 
empirical observations that is reasonable for statistical analysis, and currently there are many 
barriers that inhibit a trustworthy analysis. Overcoming this challenge will require 
unprecedented intelligence sharing, but in the meantime likelihoods must be assessed as a 
cost-benefit ratio from the perspective of an adversary.   
 Observation is the third challenge to objective risk analysis, and research conducted 
on the threat should be independent of operational processes. Just as a scientist observing an 
Amazonian tribe can result in behavior modification, so can observing a threat in the cyber 
domain. The opposite is true for observing natural threats (e.g. earthquakes, tornados, etc.), 
where observation actually improves the model’s ability to make predictions. An 
earthquake’s epicenter located under a data center can have the same business impact as a 
virus, however the same control could reduce the impact of both threats. A study must be 
commissioned to determine the appropriate distances between the assessor and the threat to 
achieve the most effective analysis.  
 Developing effective scientific controls is the fourth challenge to quantitative 
analysis, and these controls validate the effectiveness of selected alternatives and model 
reliability following implementation. Deploying these controls is incredibly risky and may 
require the organization to purposely expose itself to the adversary, but there are safe means 
to accomplish this through honeypots or by adopting the fourth cyber-defense axiom of 
active defenses. Unfortunately there is one such case where applying the fourth cyber-
defense axiom proved fatal, and this occurred during the U.S. Office of Personnel 
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Management (OPM) data breach of 2015 where a second attacker executed its attack 
undetected while the primary attacker was being closely monitored by OPM and the U.S. 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). [42]  
5.2.3 Hierarchical Challenges. 
 Carlos Jaeger has said that the most serious challenge for assessing risk in the post-
modern period will be making rational decisions collectively without sacrificing individual 
freedom. [15] Collective decision-making requires a mutual consensus on the dependencies 
between the four relational pairs (or actors) of: (a) conditions  outcomes, (b) assessors  
objects, (c) decisions  future impacts, and (d) organizations  environments. This 
consensus is achieved by allowing everyone to contribute and participate in the analysis, 
shifting priority from blame avoidance to rationality, acknowledging and not penalizing 
ignorance, and reducing the outsourcing of capabilities. People will always feel excluded 
from a process, but organizations must ensure everyone is able to make a contribution to 
solving the problem. The organizational member that makes the largest contribution is the 
decision-maker, and he or she must have an accurate understanding of their utilities and 
acceptance criteria for the proposed framework to function properly. The prospect of blame 
will influence Actor 1’s decisions against Actor 2 involving all relational pairs, but blame 
can become less of an influence if decisions are reached objectively and rationally. In 
addition to blame, the social penalties of revealing one's ignorance is a second fear. There 
will always be some degree of ignorance between relational actors, but organizations should 
view ignorance in a positive light and see these as opportunities to grow. Some ignorance is 
generated through the outsourcing of organizational capabilities where members lose 
intimate knowledge of the processes, advantages, and disadvantages of those capabilities. 
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Organizations must forecast what capabilities they can honestly afford to outsource, and this 
assessment is performed through reflexive processes. 
5.3 Path Forward 
 This framework was developed specifically as a means for the DoD to assess risk 
against federal IT systems within the cyberspace domain, and the problems mentioned 
throughout this study only become magnified if organizations continue to address and 
manage risk in prescriptive, probabilistic, and/or progressive manners. None of these 
approaches just mentioned predominately focus on optimization, but rather on containing or 
neutralizing threats through an acceleration of advancement and innovation. This strategy 
introduces additional risks because this acceleration doesn’t permit sufficient time for 
organizations to evaluate policies that are expected to effectively manage these innovations, 
and it causes hierarchical organizations to expand to points that they can no longer “win” in 
their engagements with the adversary. Though developed specifically for the DoD, this 
framework can be applied to a variety of organizations in the private sector. The DoD has 
served as a vehicle for fundamental change in the past and choosing to implement this 
framework could pave a path for other organizations to approach cyber-risks in a more 
efficient and effective manner. The framework can be implemented in five stages that (1) 
evaluates policies and processes, (2) reinforces culture and corrects the mindsets of 
organizational members, (3) consolidates risk data from multiple sources and develops the 
DSS, (4) evaluates the effectiveness of the proposed framework, and (5) synchronizes risk 
management processes with DoD Acquisition Processes (DAP). 
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Stage 1: Evaluate Current Policies and Processes. 
 The first stage is a reflexive process where the organization evaluates all current and 
past policies for effectiveness through deep collaborative discussion and analysis. Effective 
policies are cost-efficient and optimally suited to the needs of the organization, and often 
ineffective policies are maintained because there isn’t a suitable alternative available, 
substantial investments have been appropriated, or political momentum has already been 
generated. Evaluation involves asking those difficult questions that could potentially result in 
embarrassment or regret for the architects or decision-makers associated with the ineffective 
policies, but these outcomes could be avoided if the organization establishes a period of 
honest reflection and amnesty in an open forum where everyone’s opinion has equal value. 
At a minimum, every policy (or process) should be evaluated by asking the following seven 
questions: 
1. Have our risk management policies improved our organization’s three primary 
defensive properties of resilience, robustness, and redundancy? 
2.  Do the policies link to the preferences, priorities, and aims of the decision-maker? 
3. Were policy decisions made on the best logic and rationale available, or were they 
primarily influenced by biases or amplified understandings? 
4. Can we simplify our risk management processes in a more cost-efficient and effective 
manner while still meeting the objectives and priorities of the organization? 
5. Did we provide everyone the opportunity to contribute to the analysis, and does 
everyone involved in the process understand how the decision was reached?  
6. How effective were current or previous policies in reducing risk exposures, and how 
capable are our processes in reducing risk exposures in the future?  
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7. Do current policies correct the root problems that expose the organization to various 
sources of risks, or did we create additional risk by only addressing ancillary or 
second-order problems?  
Stage 2: Calibrate Organizational Culture and Mindsets. 
 Once the organization has reflected on its policies and processes, efforts should be 
directed towards strengthening its culture and unifying mindsets that influences how risk is 
constructed, perceived, and communicated across the organization. Organizational culture is 
the glue that binds its members, and ensures that policies and processes are executed in 
accordance with a spirit characteristic of the organization’s leadership. This study highlighted 
previous research by social scientists that suggest hierarchical cultures operate under the 
assumption that science and technology give them control over various hazards, but 
organizations must detach from this belief and pursue a management program that assesses 
risk as if those scenarios were to occur as according to the “fatalist” mentality. Organizations 
also need to acknowledge that probabilities are a weak method for making rational and 
logical decisions in the cyber domain, and should shift to deterministic approaches. 
Organizations also need to take a different approach to filling gaps in knowledge by avoiding 
unsolvable problems entirely, and instead focusing on assessing risk variables that can be 
measured objectively, which helps remove bias and subjectivity from the analysis. Diversity 
presents challenges to organizational cultures, but organizations can use their diversity to 
strengthen decision-making by viewing the problem from multiple perspectives. Regardless 
of how organizations decide to define their cultures, generating loyalty must be a top priority 
as loyalty suppresses the negative effects of diversity and conflicts of interest.  
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 In addition to reinforcing a culture that promotes loyalty and agreement, the 
organization must strive to correct the mindsets of those participating in the decision process. 
The major flaws with current mindsets are the beliefs that a threat must not penetrate defense 
perimeters at all cost, blame is the worst consequence of any outcome, and threat capabilities 
have the greatest influence on risk exposure. Organizations can start correcting the mindsets 
of its member by first adopting the “Four Axioms of Cyberdefense” in [27] where efforts to 
create an impenetrable defense are abandoned, and instead focusing on defenses that delay an 
attack so that security personnel can appropriately respond. A second approach is to prevent 
the fear of blame from being the primary influence in organizational decision-making. This 
fear will eventually wane simply through the adoption of objective assessments. Perhaps the 
most difficult mindset challenge is the proposal that eliminating the threat variable from a 
risk model will improve decisions regarding actions in cyberspace. Organizations must 
choose between optimization or threat intelligence as the first priority, and members must be 
shown that the conditional state of the organization plays a much larger role in the frequency 
and magnitude of catastrophic outcomes than any capabilities the threat possesses. For 
example, the United States has far superior offensive cyber capabilities than the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), but which country is perceived as the greater threat to 
the Republic of Korea (ROK)? The obvious answer is the DPRK, because the DPRK benefits 
from any damage inflicted upon the ROK while the U.S. lacks any incentive to use its 
capabilities against them. This example shows that DER (or an organization’s state of 
security against adversarial rewards) is a far more valid measurement of likelihood for an 
attack scenario than any measure of a threat’s capabilities.   
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 The combination of a strong organizational culture and corrected mindsets improves 
the decision process, such that the organization begins to take on the qualities of a cognitive 
system where every person represents a communicative node in the architecture. Members of 
this system must be calibrated to make optimal and rational decisions in order to function 
properly in the post-modern world. A Brier Scoring exercise could help calibrate members 
for rational decision-making by showing them discrepancies between their estimates and 
actual measurements. Decision-makers must also understand that we are transitioning to a 
post-modern world, and in order to succeed in this era, they need to emphasize transparency 
and problem deconstruction, and cautiously engage those risks that are fabricated by society. 
This stage can be executed in alongside the first stage, and it will take approximately six 
months to a year to complete. 
Stage 3: Consolidate Data and Develop DSS. 
 The third phase involves implementing strict cyber-incident reporting requirements 
and a massive consolidation of event logs to reduce the number of unreported cases, improve 
threat recognition, and refine heuristic analysis. Federally mandated reporting requirements 
will result in larger data collections, and consolidating these data collections will produce 
trends that enable assessors to estimate the effectiveness of security controls. Without 
jeopardizing national security or competitive advantages, this consolidation will require full 
cooperation and maximum transparency between federal agencies and the private sector in 
order to consolidate the amount of data required to determine how the conditions affect 
outcome likelihoods. Currently there is only a partial cooperation between these sectors 
which has led to severe gaps in our understanding of how cyber-risks relate to outcomes.  
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 Prior to developing a DSS designed to keep members operating within the bounds of 
the framework, the right team needs to be assembled to guarantee a product that meets the 
expectations and requirements mentioned throughout this study. At a minimum, the team 
needs to be comprised of: a tenacious project manager with vision and a complete 
understanding of the framework’s purposes, a statistician with a background in decision 
theory and risk management, an application developer with previous work developing Java 
Server Pages (or whichever platform chosen) that communicate with database management 
systems (DBMS), a database designer with a complete understanding of the data to be 
accessed by the DBMS, and a database administrator that understands the security 
requirements and applications of the program. The DBMS will need to be robust, and capable 
of managing framework processes and querying necessary information. This DBMS will 
interface with the DSS to maintain authorizations, populate security control worksheets, and 
provide the algorithms with the needed information to compute values for objective 
variables. An example of how this DBMS would function is illustrated in Appendix B. It is 
estimated that this stage will take approximately 1-2 years to develop mechanisms to 
consolidate data and pass the needed legislation, and approximately six months to develop a 
prototype DSS once consolidation efforts have reached an acceptable point. 
Stage 4: Evaluate Framework Processes.  
 The fourth phase involves evaluating the proposed framework for gained 
effectiveness and efficiency. Researchers W. DeLone and E. Mclean assessed various 
previous studies of IT project initiatives to discover key indicators of success in those 
projects. Those indicators are: (1) system quality, (2) information quality, (3) use, (4) user 
satisfaction, (5) individual impact, and (5) organizational impact. [30] System quality could 
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be demonstrated through a simulation of real-world scenarios, and comparing those results 
against the actual results to prove the framework functioned as intended. The expectation is 
that the framework and companioned DSS are highly reliable, functional, and more 
convenient as compared to the current risk management framework. Information quality is a 
challenge, as concluded by Alec Poczatec, who found that various attack graphing tools 
produced varying estimates on the same network topology. [13] There are tools in 
development that are expected to meet the expectations of security professionals, such as 
Prolog-based MulVAL (Multi-host, Multi-stage Vulnerability Analysis Language), which 
was developed by Xinming Ou, Sudhakar Govindavajhala, and Andrew W. Appel. [31] Until 
attack-graphing tools have overcome their limitations, these algorithms must be simplified 
such that the results agree across various platforms. Occasionally there are cases when the 
attack surfaces of organizational resources cannot be measured by an algorithm, and must be 
manually assessed. As such, manual computations must be calibrated so they produce similar 
results as the chosen attack-graph algorithm to prevent distortions. This calibration will 
require much evaluation to ensure weights are fairly assigned to all resources at risk. If the 
evaluation proves that attack surfaces can be effectively measured, distortions can be 
managed, and the DSS formulas compute risks such that they reasonably compare to the real 
world, then the framework has proven superior to the current approach. The usage indicator 
measures the usefulness of the proposed framework as applied to decision-making and 
problem-solving. This criterion can be evaluated through “C-level” test subjects, and their 
individual analysis of the product’s usefulness where they are surveyed on their impressions 
of comprehensiveness and the potential ability to make rational and logical decisions in 
cyberspace. User satisfaction is the third indicator, and it is vital in any potential adoption. 
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This criterion would require a similar survey conducted on many individual across all levels 
of the organization, whose feedback would be used to refine the framework and determine 
any deficiencies. Individual impact is the fourth indicator, and it is measured by the benefits 
the proposed framework provides over the current framework to individual people. This 
criterion can be evaluated by comparing the accuracy, predictability, reliability, and 
transparency of the proposed framework. These metrics speak volumes about how the 
proposed framework magnifies those intrinsic and extrinsic goals of the individual; for 
example, performing better at their jobs and their ability to maximize contributions to the 
overall success of the organization. This last metric leads into the final indicator, which is the 
organizational impact criterion. Positive organizational impacts can be measured by 
comparing the cost-effectiveness, reciprocity, and effectiveness of the proposed framework. 
This study has already suggested that less human capital will be required to produce precise 
estimates, the framework can function across a variety of domains, and objective analysis is a 
far more effective approach to assessing risk than subjective approaches. This criterion is 
heavily dependent on the previous four measurements to determine overall effectiveness and 
feasibility, and an approximation of total organizational benefits. This study suggests 
including several case studies to evaluate the framework as a final demonstration of its 
superiority. This stage will take approximately six months and involve many people in the 
organization to reasonably evaluate the proposed framework.  
Stage 5: Synchronize w/ DAP. 
 The final stage involves synchronizing DoD Acquisition Processes (DAP) with the  
RMF to allow the two efforts to operate in parallel for further gains in organizational 
efficiency. As opposed to the five-step parallel process that coincides with the NIST RMF, 
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this study proposes an nine-step DAP as outlined in Table 5 on the next page. The first DAP 
step corresponds with RMF 2.0 Step 1 where the appropriate program manager is assigned to 
develop the acquisition strategy for the system being developed, introduced, or reassessed. 
Acquisition strategies correspond to the length of programs, or Acquisitions Category 
(ACAT). Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) officer, MAJ Mitchell Hockenbury, suggests the 
planning requirements of the proposed framework would correspond to ACAT I, which is a 
long-term funding strategy used for programs such as the F-35 Strike Fighter. [M. 
Hockenbury, personal communication, 2016] Once the decision-maker sets acceptability 
criteria, the program manager can then suggest minimum security baselines that associate 
with the classification or category of the requested system. The identification of risk factors 
by Tier 2 helps the program manager forecast the appropriations needed to support the 
program. While Tier 3 assesses likelihoods and impacts, the program manager develops test 
and evaluation criteria that will later be operationally tested as Tier 3 evaluates existing 
controls. The program manager performs cross-mission (or function) analysis while Tier 3 
conducts an impact analysis to prioritize expenditures across the organization. After a cross-
mission analysis, the program manager develops the procurement strategy that corresponds to 
Tier 2’s recommendations for control enhancement. Once Tier 1 approves the final security 
plan, the program manager presents a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) that outlines 
timeframes and provides a breakdown of costs to implement the security plan. Following 
Step 8 and final approval by the decision-maker, the program manager decides on a life-cycle 
management program to set retirement periods for various systems. MAJ Mitchell 
Hockenbury feels that the proposed DAP/RMF synchronization strategy is a realistic 
proposal, but cautions that funds are released conditionally and not in one lump sum as Table 
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5 suggests in the third step. [M. Hockenbury, personal communication, 2016] It is impossible 
for me to estimate the length of time required to synchronize DAP with the proposed 
framework since the responsibility will fall upon the Army Acquisition Corps to complete 
the analysis involved in this stage; the suggested synchronization strategy is merely a 
proposal from the perspective of an information security professional.   
Table 5. - RMF 2.0 and DAP Parallel Processes 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 This study was partly inspired by authors Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner who 
demonstrated the need to look beyond common rationality to determine the true causes 
behind various social phenomena in their 2005 book “Freakonomics”. A former boss also 
planted seeds that inspired this undertaking, and those seeds were his convictions that (1) 
directly observing behavior can indirectly affect outcomes and (2) a risk analysis is a 
reflection of a planner’s investment in a program. Throughout this study, I have developed a 
shared conclusion with David Garland that the world is in fact “spinning out of control” as 
indicated by our insatiable determination to control our futures which has further amplified 
our expectations and divided our beliefs. I strongly feel that my one year old daughter, Nora, 
deserves to live in a world better than the one that is being prepared for her, and this world is 
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becoming one where agencies are executing actions with severe consequences based on 
faulty premises and unsubstantiated assumptions. Perhaps society should abandon this 
determination, and engage risk with the mentality once applied by the Romans? I am not 
suggesting that we revert to the use of oracles or dice to decide upon courses of action, but 
rather that we aggressively confront risk in a manner similar to their approach. Doing so will 
enable society to engage risk on a more productive level and help reveal the root causes 
leading to risk scenarios. The current methods of modeling risk have reached a point of 
complexity and subjectivity that they are no longer effective for a modern society 
approaching the cusp of a post-modern period.  
 A misperceived assessment of risk against advancements in science and technology is 
partly to blame for innovative acceleration and decline in social values. Prior to these 
advancements, society primarily relied on religion to maintain stability and provide guidance 
when faced with problems; severe outcomes were believed to merely be “acts of God” and 
any blasphemies resulted in harsh social penalties. With each advancement, society’s 
commitment to faith has eroded little by little, and the voids have been replaced with 
accepted rationality and scientific theories. This cultural renaissance will only accelerate, 
which I believe will make the management of risk an even greater challenge. The “War on 
Drugs” is one such example that shows how an erosion of moral values and technology have 
only exacerbated our problems. The reason this war has not demonstrated its expected 
success is a result of a chosen strategy where each opponent seeks superior capabilities and 
intelligence versus attacking the true contributor to this war. The true contributing factors to 
this war are the increasing demands and consumption of drugs! I have always championed 
science and technology, but there also needs to be a resurgence in the moral values that have 
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always been promoted by various fundamental ideologies to succeed. Moral analysis and 
science must complement each other to combat destructive social issues, and abandoning 
either destabilizes the effort. In addition to moral and ethical values, discretion should be 
exercised when including probabilities within the risk equation simply because bad outcomes 
will occur regardless of any strategy. The Romans didn’t concern themselves with “chance” 
and they assumed outcomes were due to the “will of the gods”, yet they were highly 
successful in their campaigns. Their example demonstrates the potential of society 
retroactively returning to some exercise of faith and refocusing on optimization versus 
placing our whole trust in science and technology to succeed over our opponents. 
 I am optimistic for the future, and I believe eventually organizations will become 
aware that rationality based on direct observations to support their decision-making processes 
will result in superior outcomes over the long-term. Effective rationality will require 
patience, objective measurements of risk, full acknowledgements of uncertainty, a shared 
understanding of the decision-maker’s utility functions, and most importantly mutual 
consensus across organizations. A rational explanation for the increasing frequency of chaos 
in the world often points the finger at advancements in technology, but the true contributors 
to this volatility are the users of this technology. Users often lack patience to completely 
evaluate new technologies, make decisions based upon false senses of security, and develop 
misguided perceptions of the advantages gained by employing new technologies. These 
errors must be corrected in order to enter the post-modern world. The optimistic side of me 
envisions a post-modern world where terror becomes far less frequent, there is a greater 
understanding between various cultures, and we experience progress never before witnessed. 
This progress would first require organizations to surrender their attempt to control nature 
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and society, and to adapt to them in a responsible and logical manner. True progress will be 
achieved when organizations abandon any prospect of absolute control (outside of their 
nature), and this abandonment will result in fewer introduced risks as they harness the 
capabilities of technological advancements with greater caution. 
Obviously the proposed framework is almost diametrically opposed to most common 
approaches and many people will be uncomfortable implementing it at first, but it is 
contested ideas that moves the country forward. This framework provides part of the solution 
to correcting those mindsets and flawed approaches that hinder progress. Progress will be 
achieved in the post-modern world if we take on a more proscriptive, deterministic, and 
reflexive approach to objectively modeling and assessing risk that additionally reduces 
complexity, influential biases, and organizational disagreements. A combined approach 
cannot do it alone, and will require elements of multiple theories to explain how and why the 
approach meets expectations. Many of these theories used throughout this study were 
developed by social scientists, and social science will be essential to critiquing risk models 
that describe risk from an objective position, as stated by David Spiegelhalter in [22]. 
Monumental change will occur if a risk management framework is proposed that 
demonstrates significant gains in efficiency and effectiveness, but the decision to implement 
such a framework is ultimately up the decision-makers, because they primarily assume risk 
for their organizations. Regardless of the methods chosen to assess risk, organizations must 
find their own means to link risk to mission assurance. 
This project initially began with a purpose of discovering a means to synchronize 
acquisition programs with risk analysis processes that determines how much organizations 
should invest in their cyber security programs. But we have an even greater need to revisit 
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our fundamental approaches to assessing risk in the cyberspace domain. When I approached 
my thesis professor about my proposal, Dr. Davis’s advice was to combine all my 
experiences and knowledge as an information security professional, and develop a solution as 
if inside a “black box”. I knew three things beforehand: (1) any proposed framework must 
implement a model that assesses risk from an objective perspective, and it’s impossible to 
accurately quantify cyber threats, (2) the model’s output must direct the decision-making 
body to the most optimal security options, and (3) cyber-risks are far more complex than 
traditional risks and cannot be assessed in the same manner. The results from that “black 
box” session eventually materialized into the concepts described throughout this work. It is 
my sincere hope that this proposal for a new risk management framework results in some 
adaptation that will influence how the DoD assesses cyber-risk in the future, and will 
ultimately lead to greater success and prosperity in my daughter’s future.   
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY   
1.  Abstraction - The process of considering something independently of its associations, 
attributes, or concrete accompaniments. 
 
2.  Access Rights - The permissions that are granted to a user, or to an application, to read, 
write and erase files in the computer. 
 
3.  Actuarial Observations - The application of mathematical and statistical methods to 
assess risk; based on historical data. 
 
4.  Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) - A set of stealthy and continuous computer hacking 
processes, often orchestrated by human(s) targeting a specific entity for business or 
political motives, using sophisticated techniques. 
 
5.  Adversary - An individual or organization (including an agency of a nation state) that 
conducts cyber espionage, crime or attack. 
 
6.  Algorithm - A process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-
solving operations, especially by a computer. 
 
7.  Analog Representation - A value or variable in analog form. 
 
8.  Approach - A formal or informal method of dealing with something. 
 
9.  Attack Surface - The sum of the different points (the "attack vectors") where an 
unauthorized user (the "attacker") can try to enter data to or extract data from an 
environment. Part of the analysis performed by an Attack-Graph algorithm. 
 
10. Axiom - A statement that is so evident or well-established, that it is accepted without 
controversy or question. Thus, the axiom can be used as the premise or starting point 
for further reasoning or arguments, usually in logic or in mathematics. 
 
11. Bayes Theorem - Describes the probability of an event, based on conditions that might be 
related to the event; P(A|B) = P(A) P(B|A) / P)B). P = Probability, A and B = Events.  
 
12. Beijing Butterfly Effect - The sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small 
change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences 
in a later state. 
 
13. Best Business Practices - A set of methods or techniques that have been generally 
accepted as superior to any alternatives because they produce results that are superior 
to those achieved by other means or because it has become a standard way of doing 
things; are also used to maintain quality as an alternative to mandatory legislated 
standards based on self-assessment or benchmarking. 
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14. Blame - assign responsibility for a fault or wrong; equals Perceived Avoidable Harm (or 
Loss) time + Perceived Responsibility time. 
 
15. Brier Scoring Rule - Can be thought of as a measure of the "calibration" of a set of 
probabilistic predictions, and is applicable to tasks in which predictions must assign 
probabilities to a set of mutually exclusive discrete outcomes. 
 
16. Bureaucracy - A body of non-elective government officials" and/or "an administrative 
policy-making group. 
 
17. Casus Belli - Latin term for an event or action that justifies a war. 
 
18. Catch-22 - A dilemma or difficult circumstance from which there is no escape because of 
mutually conflicting or dependent conditions. 
 
19. Causal Agent - Any entity that produces an effect or is responsible for events or results. 
 
20. Channel Protocol - The protocol used to access a channel, and imposes restrictions on 
the data exchange allowed using the channel, e.g., a TCP socket 
 
21. Channels - a means to connect to a system and send (receive) data to (from) a system. 
 
22. Chaos Theory - A field of study that examimines the behavior of dynamical systems that 
are highly sensitive to initial conditions, and whose future behavior is fully 
determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements involved. 
 
23. Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) - A free and open industry standard for 
assessing the severity of computer system security vulnerabilities. CVSS attempts to 
assign severity scores to vulnerabilities, allowing responders to prioritize responses 
and resources according to threat. 
 
24. Compartmentalization - Creating logical boundaries among information sets that limit 
access to information to persons or other entities who need to know it in order to 
perform certain tasks. 
 
25. Computing Environment - The aggregate of surrounding things, conditions, or 
influences involving users, hardware, operating system, and/or software. 
 
26. Confidence Interval - An observed interval (i.e., it is calculated from the observations), 
in principle different from sample to sample, that frequently includes the value of an 
unobservable parameter of interest if the experiment is repeated. Formula equals 
((sample mean - critical value) * (stdDev/square root of #observations)) + (critical 
value * (stdDev/square root of #observations).  
 
27. Cost/Risk Analysis - A comparison of an organization’s investment into their security 
program versus the expected cost of an risk outcome.  
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28. Cultural Filters - Filters that select and construe evidence to support established biases, 
and especially true when data is contested, ambiguous, or inconclusive; the two forms 
are Rewards and Costs.  
 
29. Culture Theory - The branch of comparative anthropology and semiotics that seeks to 
define the heuristic concept of culture in operational and/or scientific terms. 
 
30. Cyber - Prefix comes from Greek word - cybernetics, which means “governance”. 
Defined in 1948 by Norbet Weiner as “the scientific study of control and 
communication in the animal and machine.” Now often implies, in contemporary 
sense, “control of any system using technology”. 
 
31. Cybersecurity - The state of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of 
electronic data, or the measures taken to achieve this. 
 
32. Cyberspace - the notional environment in which communication over computer networks 
occurs.  
 
33. Damage-Effort Ratio (DER) - The contribution of a resource to the attack surface based 
on the level of harm the attacker can cause to the system in using the resource in an 
attack and the effort the attacker spends to acquire the necessary access rights in order 
to be able to use the resource in an attack. 
 
34. Data Abstraction - A technique for arranging complexity of computer systems by 
establishing a level of complexity on which a person interacts with the system, 
suppressing the more complex details below the current level. 
 
35. Data Distribution - An arrangement of values of a variable showing observed or 
theoretical frequency of occurrence. 
 
36. Data Resources - A component of information technology infrastructure that represents 
all the data available to an organization, whether they are automated or non-
automated. 
 
37. Decision Matrix - A technique used to rank the multi-dimensional options of an option 
set; consists of a set of criteria options which are scored and summed to gain a total 
score which can then be ranked 
 
38. Decision Support System - A computer-based information system that supports business 
or organizational decision-making activities. 
 
39. Decision Theory - The study of strategies for optimal decision-making between options 
involving different risks or expectations of gain or loss depending on the outcome. 
 
40. Decision Variables - The variables within a model that one can control. 
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41. Denial of Service Attack (DoS) - An attempt to make a machine or network resource 
unavailable to its intended users, such as to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or 
suspend services of a host connected to the Internet. 
 
42. Descriptive Decision Theory - Explains and predicts how people make decisions; 
empirical and experimental. 
 
43. Determinism - A philosophical doctrine that all events transpire in virtue of some 
necessity and are therefore inevitable. All data is known before analysis. 
 
44. Deterministic - Relating to the philosophical doctrine that all events, including human 
action, are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the will. 
 
45. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) - Provides information technology (IT) 
and communications support to the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, 
the military services, the combatant commands, and any individual or system 
contributing to the defense of the United States. 
 
46. DoD Component - Includes OSD; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff; 
the DoD Inspector General; the Military Departments including the Coast Guard 
when assigned to the Department of the Navy; the Defense Agencies; DoD Field 
Activities; the Combatant Commands; Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), 
the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), and all non-
appropriated fund instrumentalities. 
 
47. Dominance Principle - Where one alternative can be ranked as superior to another 
alternative for a broad class of decision-makers. It is based on shared preferences 
regarding sets of possible outcomes and their associated probabilities. Strong 
Dominance = ai ≻ aj iff. v(ai, sm) ≥ v(aj, sm). 
 
48. Dynamic - A process or system characterized by constant change, activity, or progress. 
 
49. Egalitarian - Of, relating to, or believing in the principle that all people are equal and 
deserve equal rights and opportunities. 
 
50. Empirical Observations - The knowledge (or source of knowledge) acquired by means of 
the senses, particularly by observation and experimentation. 
 
51. Entry/Exit Points - The methods in a system’s codebase that receive data from the 
system’s environment are the exit points, and a system’s methods that send data to the 
system’s environment are the system’s exit points. 
 
52. Exchange Principle - Principle that the perpetrator of a crime will bring something into 
the crime scene and leave with something from it, and that both can be used as 
forensic evidence. Also known as Locard’s Principle. 
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53. Expected Net Benefits in Information Security (ENBIS) - Formula proposed by 
academics Gordon and Loeb to determine optimal amount to spend on an 
organization’s info-sec program; equals [vulnerability - Information Set (investment, 
vulnerability)] * Loss - Investment, or {ENBIS (z) = [v - S(z, v)] L - z}. 
 
54. Expected Utility Function - A hypothesis that states that a decision-maker’s expected 
utility for a particular action-observation combination equals the sum of probabilities 
for the states of the world as observed (o) while taking action (a), and our preferences 
over the space of outcomes are represented by U (si); in formula form EU (a|o) = Σ P 
(si|a,o) U (si).  
 
55. Expected Value - In probability theory, the expected value of a random variable is 
intuitively the long-run average value of repetitions of the experiment it represents. In 
decision theory, it is computed as the Σ Outcome Values (Outcome Probabilities). 
 
56. Fatalist - Someone who believes that all events or actions are subjugated to fate.  
 
57. Federal Information Security Act of 2002 (FISMA) - An act requiring each federal 
agency to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to provide 
information security for the information and information systems that support the 
operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another 
agency, contractor, or other source.  
 
58. Framework - A strategy for prioritizing and sharing information about the security risks 
to an information technology (IT) infrastructure. 
 
59. Functional Worth - The cost for a function to be performed. 
 
60. Game Theory - The study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between 
intelligent rational decision-makers. 
 
61. Gartner - An American research and advisory firm providing information technology 
related insight. 
 
63. Glass’s Law of Complexity - A series of laws developed by American software engineer 
Robert L. Glass that supposes that every 25% increase in capability yields a 100% 
increase in complexity.  
 
64. Globalization - The process of international integration arising from the interchange of 
world views, products, ideas, and other aspects of culture. 
 
65. Granularity - To the extent to which a larger entity is subdivided, or the extent to which 
groups of smaller indistinguishable entities have joined together to become larger 
distinguishable entities. 
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66. Hawthorne Effect - The alteration of behavior by the subjects of a study due to their 
awareness of being observed. 
 
67. Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle - A variety of mathematical inequalities asserting a 
fundamental limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties of a 
particle, known as complementary variables, such as position x and momentum p, can 
be known. 
 
68. Hierarchy - A system or organization in which people or groups are ranked one above 
the other according to status or authority. 
 
69. Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) - A model that organizes and presents a 
complete set of system risk categories or requirements for success. 
 
70. High Reliability Organizations (HRO) - An organization that has succeeded in avoiding 
catastrophes in an environment where normal accidents can be expected due to risk 
factors and complexity. 
 
71. Impact - The measured consequences of an event or activity, and the influence on 
individual functions of an organization. 
 
72. Impact Analysis - A collection of information on critical business functions that is 
evaluated, and then used to quantify the potential effects if a disaster occurs. 
 
73. Individualism - A social theory favoring freedom of action for individuals over collective 
or state control. 
 
74. Individualization - A process where emphasis is placed on the moral worth of the 
individual. Individualists promote the exercise of one's goals and desires, value 
independence and self-reliance, and advocate that the interests of the individual 
should take precedence over the state or a social group. 
 
75. Info-Gap Procedure - A non-probabilistic decision theory that seeks to optimize 
robustness to failure – or opportuneness for windfall – under severe uncertainty in 
particular applying sensitivity analysis of the stability radius type to perturbations in 
the value of a given estimate of the parameter of interest.  
 
76. Instance-Based Learning Theory (IBLT) - Representing and predicting an individual’s 
behavior of decisions from experience. 
 
77. Instrumental Rationality - The decision-maker’s personal aims or objectives for the 
organization that are used to guide decisions. 
 
78. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) - A scientific and 
intergovernmental body under the auspices of the United Nations, set up at the 
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request of member governments, dedicated to the task of providing the world with an 
objective, scientific view of climate change and its political and economic impacts. 
  
79. Internet Computing Technologies (ICT) - An extended term for information technology 
(IT) which stresses the role of unified communications and the integration of 
telecommunications (telephone lines and wireless signals), computers, and necessary 
enterprise software, middleware, storage, and audio-visual systems, which enable 
users to access, store, transmit, and manipulate information. 
 
80. Kafkaesque Nightmare - Characteristic or reminiscent of the oppressive or nightmarish 
qualities of Franz Kafka's fictional world. 
 
81. Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility - A law of economics stating that as a person 
increases consumption of a product, while keeping consumption of other products 
constant, there is a decline in the marginal utility that person derives from consuming 
each additional unit of that product. 
 
82. Likelihood - A measurement that describes the potential of an event or activity to result 
in a particular outcome. 
 
83. Luhmann’s Abstract Theory - Theory that proposes society is a (1) Communicative 
System that operates much like a human consciousness, where there is a constant 
flow of communication and there is a (2) Cognitive System where there is a constant 
flow of thoughts. Both observe something. 
 
84. Man-in-the-Middle Attack - An attack where the attacker secretly relays and possibly 
alters the communication between two parties who believe they are directly 
communicating with each other. 
 
85. Markov Decision Process (MDP) - A mathematical framework for modeling decision 
making in situations where outcomes are partly random and partly under the control 
of a decision maker. MDPs are useful for studying a wide range of optimization 
problems solved via dynamic programming and reinforcement learning. 
 
86. Method Privilege - The method an attacker uses to elevate privileges on a computing 
system. 
 
87. Modeling - The representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of 
a system, often implemented by a computer program. 
 
88. Modernism - In general, includes the activities and creations of those who felt the 
traditional forms of art, architecture, literature, religious faith, philosophy, social 
organization, activities of daily life, and even the sciences, were becoming ill-fitted to 
their tasks and outdated in the new economic, social, and political environment of an 
emerging fully industrialized world. 
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89. Monte Carlo Method (MCM) - A broad class of computational algorithms that rely on 
repeated random sampling to obtain numerical results. They are often used in 
physical and mathematical problems and are most useful when it is difficult or 
impossible to use other mathematical methods. 
 
90. Monumental Change - Emerging events that change everything at the level of their 
scope which can be fact, theory, paradigm, episteme, ontos, existence, or absolute. 
 
91. Moving Target Defense (MTD) - A new strategy motivated by the asymmetric costs 
borne by cyber defenders that takes an advantage afforded to attackers and reverses it 
to advantage defenders instead. 
 
92. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) - A measurement standards 
laboratory, and a non-regulatory agency of the United States Department of 
Commerce. Its mission is to promote innovation and industrial competitiveness. Its 
activities are organized into laboratory programs that include Nanoscale Science and 
Technology, Engineering, Information Technology, Neutron Research, Material 
Measurement, and Physical Measurement. 
 
93. Non-Cooperative Game - A theoretical game in which players make decisions 
independently. Thus, while players could cooperate, any cooperation must be self-
enforcing. 
 
94. Non-Linear - A mathematical function or graph plot such that results represent a 
relationship that opposes a linear plot. 
 
95. Normative Decision Theory - Yields prescriptions for what are rationally correct 
decisions (what one ought to do). 
 
96. Objectivity - A philosophical concept where the state or quality of being true is outside of 
a subject's individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings. 
 
97. Office of Management and Budget - The largest office within the Executive Office of 
the President of the United States (EOP) that is responsible for producing the 
President's Budget. OMB also measures the quality of agency programs, policies, and 
procedures to see if they comply with the president's policies and coordinates inter-
agency policy initiatives. 
 
98. Opprobrium - Point where blame-makers and takers intersect. 
 
99. Optimism-Pessimism Rule - A formula used to assist decision-makers in considering the 
best and worst outcomes, where a choice is based on performance. Can be conceived 
as a generalization of the Maximin and Maximax Rules. Formula = ai aj if and only if 
α · max(ai) + (1 − α) · min(ai) > α · max(aj) + (1 − α) · min(aj).  
 
100. Optimization - The action of making the best or most effective use of a situation or 
resource. 
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101. Organizational Maturity - The level of an organization’s readiness and experience in 
relation to people, processes, technologies and consistent measurement practices. 
 
102. Organizational Tier - Hierarchies of command within an organization; typically 
structured in three tiers for managing a large, wide-spread organization. Information 
flows both ways between staff and managers, and between managers and the 
executive level; managers generally have the authority to make changes to directives 
from the executive level. 
 
103. Pareto’s Improvement - An economic state where resources are allocated in the most 
efficient manner. Pareto efficiency is obtained when a distribution strategy exists 
where one party's situation cannot be improved without making another party's 
situation worse. Pareto efficiency does not imply equality or fairness. 
 
104. Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) - A permanent record that identifies tasks to 
be accomplished in order to resolve security weaknesses. Required for any 
accreditation decision that requires corrective actions, it specifies resources required 
to accomplish the tasks enumerated in the plan and milestones for completing the 
tasks. 
 
105. Poisson Distribution - A discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability 
of a given number of events occurring in a fixed interval of time and/or space if these 
events occur with a known average rate and independently of the time since the last 
event. Formula is P(k events in Interval) = λke-λ/k!; λ = avg# of events, e=Euler’s #, 
K! - Factorial. 
 
106. Post-Modernism - Typically defined by an attitude of skepticism or distrust toward 
grand narratives, ideologies, and various tenets of Enlightenment rationality, 
including the existence of objective reality and absolute truth, as well as notions of 
rationality, human nature, and progress; a departure from modernism. Assumes the 
notion of a "deconstructive" approach that implies an analysis that questions the 
already evident understanding of a text in terms of presuppositions, ideological 
underpinnings, hierarchical values, and frames of reference. 
 
107. Post-Normal Science - A novel approach for the use of science on issues with uncertain 
facts, disputed values, high stakes, and urgent decisions. Also described as the stage 
where we are today, where all the comfortable assumptions about science, its 
production and its use, are in question. 
 
108. Pre-Mortem Analysis - A managerial strategy in which a manager imagines that a 
project or organization has failed, and then works backward to determine what 
potentially could lead to the failure of the project or organization. 
 
109. Prescriptive - A preemptive measure implemented to reduce or mitigate the 
consequences of an event or activity.  
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110. Principle of Insufficient Reason - States that if the (n) possibilities are 
indistinguishable except for their names, then each possibility should be assigned a 
probability equal to 1/n. 
 
111. Probabilis - Latin foundation for English word probability; translates to “a measure of 
the authority of a witness in a legal case, and often correlated with the witness's 
nobility”. 
 
112. Probabilistic - Based on or adapted to a theory of probability; subject to or involving 
chance variation. 
 
113. Progressive - An aggressive strategy to further advancement and an understanding of 
processes, objects, or behaviors.  
 
114. Proscriptive - A strategy that develops measures that condemn an event or activity; 
relates to pre-mortem analysis.  
 
115. Prospect Theory - A behavioral economic theory that describes the way people choose 
between probabilistic alternatives that involve risk, where the probabilities of 
outcomes are known. The theory states that people make decisions based on the 
potential value of losses and gains rather than the final outcome, and that people 
evaluate these losses and gains using certain heuristics. 
 
116. Psychometric - A field of study concerned with the theory and technique of 
psychological measurement, and with the objective measurement of skills and 
knowledge, abilities, attitudes, personality traits, and educational achievement. 
 
117. Rational Action Theory - A framework for understanding and often formally modeling 
social and economic behavior. The basic premise of rational action theory is that 
aggregate social behavior results from the behavior of individual actors, each of 
whom is making their individual decisions. The theory therefore focuses on the 
determinants of the individual choices. 
 
118. Rationality - The quality or state of being reasonable, based on facts or reason. 
Rationality implies the conformity of one's beliefs with one's reasons to believe, or of 
one's actions with one's reasons for action. Determining optimality for rational 
behavior requires a quantifiable formulation of the problem, and making several key 
assumptions. 
 
119. Reciprocity - The practice of exchanging things with others for mutual benefit, 
especially privileges granted by one country or organization to another. 
 
120. Redundancy - The duplication of critical components or functions of a system with the 
intention of increasing reliability of the system, usually in the form of a backup or 
fail-safe. 
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121. Reflexive - Of a method or theory in the social sciences that takes into account of itself 
or of the effect of the personality or presence of the subject on what (i.e. object) is 
being investigated. A reflexive relationship is bidirectional with both the cause and 
the effect affecting one another in a relationship in which neither can be assigned as 
causes or effects. A high level of social reflexivity would be defined by an individual 
shaping their own norms, tastes, politics, desires, and so on. 
 
122. Reflexive Modernization - A process of modernization that is characteristic of risk 
society whereby progress is achieved through reorganization and reform. Science and 
technology as it is used for the purpose of reflexive modernization is less concerned 
with expanding the resource base, and more with re-evaluating that which is already 
being used by society. There is a constant flow of information between science and 
industry, and progress is achieved through the resulting reforms and adaptations. This 
is considered a reflexive modernity because it opposes its earlier version, in the same 
way the first modernity opposed feudal traditionalism 
 
123. Resilience - A design objective that reinforces the ability to absorb or avoid damage 
without suffering complete failure. 
 
124. Risk - The measured certainty of an outcome due to an event or activity where these 
outcomes result as sequences of cause and effect. 
 
125. Risk Avoidance - A risk assessment technique that entails eliminating hazards, activities 
and exposures that place an organization's valuable assets at risk. 
 
126. Risk Cost Estimate - The cost of corrective action as compared to a baseline estimate. 
Example: Risk Cost Estimate = Risk Cost (.5(BCE) + Baseline Cost Estimate ($5) = 
$7.50. 
 
127. Risk Determinate Factors (RDF) - A computation performed by dividing previous risk 
cost/time estimates by the actual costs/times; it is a number between 0-1 if costs or 
times were underestimated. Can be used to refine the estimates of risk times or costs.  
 
128. Risk Factors - A feature or characteristic that contributes to the risk exposure for an 
organization.  
 
129. Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management (RFRM) - A framework developed by 
Yacov Haimes that covers eight phases to identify, prioritize, assess, and manage risk 
scenarios of a large-scale system.  
 
130. Risk Time Estimate - A quantified measure of the corrective action time as compared to 
a baseline estimate. Example: Risk Time Estimate = Risk Time (.5(BTE)) + Baseline 
Time Estimate (24mo) = 36 months. 
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131. Risk-Society - A society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), 
which generates the notion of risk, and serves as a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself. 
 
132. Robustness - A design concept that reduces variation in a product without eliminating 
the causes of the variation.  
 
133. Root - A special user account used for system administration. 
 
134. Royal Society - The oldest and most prestigious scientific society in Britain. It was 
formed by followers of Francis Bacon to promote scientific discussion, especially in 
the physical sciences, and received its charter from Charles II in 1662 
 
135. Security Controls - Safeguards or countermeasures to avoid, detect, counteract, or 
minimize security risks to physical property, information, computer systems, or other 
assets. Controls help to reduce the risk of damage or loss by stopping, deterring, or 
slowing down an attack against an asset. 
 
136. Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) - A structural description of the 
social amplification of risk where amplification occurs at two stages: in the transfer of 
information about the risk, and in the response mechanisms of society. Signals about 
risk are processed by individual and social amplification stations, including the 
scientist who communicates the risk assessment, the news media, cultural groups, 
interpersonal networks, and others. Key steps of amplifications can be identified at 
each stage. The amplified risk leads to behavioral responses, which, in turn, result in 
secondary impacts. Models are presented that portray the elements and linkages in the 
proposed conceptual framework. 
 
137. Social Choice Theory - A theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual 
opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social 
welfare in some sense. 
 
138. Socioeconomic - Relating to or concerned with the interaction of social and economic 
factors. 
 
139. State Variables - One of the variables used to describe the state of a dynamical system. 
Each state variable corresponds to one of the coordinates of the underlying state 
space. 
 
140. Strategic - Relating to the identification of long-term or overall aims and interests and 
the means of achieving them. 
 
141. Subjective Expected Utility Function - In decision theory, the attractiveness of an 
economic opportunity as perceived by a decision-maker in the presence of risk. The 
weight of each opportunity is assigned in the following steps: 1. List # of 
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Alternatives, 2. Compute Expected Utilities, 3. Estimate Likely Outcomes, 4. Assign 
probability estimates, 5. Optimize Rule. Formula = ∑ u(xi) P(xi). 
 
142. Subjectivity - Some information, idea, situation, or physical thing considered true only 
from the perspective of a subject or subjects. 
 
143. Tactical - Of, relating to, or constituting actions carefully planned to gain a specific end. 
 
144. Technical Risk Management - The executive function of controlling hazards and perils.  
 
145. Trade-Off Analysis - An analysis strategy that employs Pareto Principles to compare 
options where one quality or aspect is lost in return for a gained quality or aspect. 
 
146. Transitivity - Whenever A > B and B > C, then A > C is inferred.  
 
147. U.S. Department of Commerce - The Cabinet department of the United States 
government concerned with promoting economic growth with a mission to promote 
job creation and improved living standards for all Americans by creating an 
infrastructure that promotes economic growth, technological competitiveness, and 
sustainable development. Among its tasks are gathering economic and demographic 
data for business and government decision-making, and helping to set industrial 
standards. 
 
148. Uncertainty - A state of having limited knowledge where it is impossible to exactly 
describe the existing state, a future outcome, or more than one possible outcome. 
 
149. Uncertainty Principle - See Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle.  
 
150. Untrusted Data Resources - Hardware, software, information, protocols, or network 
environments that are by necessity untrusted or not secure.  
 
151. Utility - A measure of preferences over some set of goods and services, or the measured 
contribution of something to someone’s definition of success.  
 
152. Vulnerability - An expression of the multi-dimensionality of disasters by focusing 
attention on the totality of relationships in a given situation which constitute a 
condition that, in combination with environmental qualities, produces a disaster. 
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APPENDIX B. 
NIST RA, DSS PROCESSES, and DATABASE STRUCTURE DIAGRAM 
 
Figure 12. NI ST Risk Assessment Process
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Figures 13, 14, 15, 16. - DSS Processes 
 
 
Figure 17. -  DSS Database Structure Diagram 
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Figure 17. (Continued) 
 
 
 
